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CHAPTER ONE
INEQUALITY AND THE CASE AGAINST CAPITALISM
George Gilder begins his book Wealth and Poverty by
noting the fact that although socialism has fewer friends
and less persuasive defenses than at any time in this century, capitalism has not enjoyed a corresponding increase
in public esteem.

1

Despite the disenchantment with the

most readily available alternative, those who practice
capitalism and those who preach it remain on the defensive.
It is of little use for the defenders of capitalism to point
out the staggering productivity of market economies.
. acknowledged this fact in 1848,

~hen

Marx

asserted that capital-

ism's dynamism only increased the urgency of going beyond
•t •
l.

2

Nor does the assertion by capitalism's defenders that

civil liberties have never lasted for long in any society
. with a centralized economy satisfy the market's critics.
Arthur Okun acknowledges this claim, but does not regard it
as decisi~e. 3
1

George Gilder, Wealth and Poverty (New York:
Books, 1981), p. 3.

Basic

~arl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, in Karl Marx:.Selected Writings, ~d. David McLellan
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 224-225.
\rthur Okun ,: Equality and Efficiency: 'rhe Big Trade(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975), pp.
38-40.

2!!

1

2

What is the source of this continuing rejection of the
market economy?

Though capitalism is a lightening rod for a

number of resentments, the most significant vulnerability of·
capitalism, the aspect that elicits both stern intellectual
critiques and popular resentment, is economic inequality.
Bertrand de Jouvenel summarizes the situation n._eatly:

"High

living" --owing a yacht, for instance--is considered doubly
evil by modern moral sensibilities.
ostentatious and decadent.

It is evil in itself,

It is even worse that the yacht

could be sold to alleviate "low living," such as a shortage
of penicillin for ghetto children. 4 The case against capitalism can be presented in many ways; the statistics detail.
5
ing who gets what lend themselves to innumerable refinements.
But the moral rejection of inequality is a fundamental fact.
The efforts by capitalism's defenders to come to grips
with this fact have not been notably successful.

The most

direct response has been to attack modern egalitarian sentiments.

If the dist.ribution of wealth under capitalism offend-

ed modern moral sensibilities, the problem was with those
sensibilities, not capitalism.
4

Social Darwinism stands as

Bertrand de Jouvenel, The Ethics of Redistribution
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), p. 22.
5

Okun, pp. 68-69.

3

the most extreme version of this point of view.
formulation~

the

wor~gs

In its

of the market economy not only do

not offend, but perfect_ly embody, the deepest moral imperatives.

The poor, far from being vi.ctim.s or simply unfortunate,· are fully deserving of their lot. 6 More recent capi-

talist distribution ethics have been less ambitious.

Milton

Friedmants is based on the rights of private property:.

"To

each according to what he and the instruments he owns produces.n7

Robert Nozickts rule,

11

From each as they [sic]

choose, to each as they Isic] are chosen,u stresses the paramount importance of unfettered exchange. 8
But the capitalist morality, whether founded on the
survival of the
change~

fittest~

or private property, or free ex-

has not been able to supplant the moral revulsion of

extreme inequality.

Over the last century, defenders of the

marketcs inequalities have steadily lost ground to those who
want to limit those inequalities.

Child labor laws, social

. security, progressive income taxes--a.ll reflect this trend.
More importantly, they reinforce it..

Egalitarians can offer

6see_Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American
Thought, revised ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), pp. 3-11.
7Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago:
.
University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 161-162.
8

Ro~ert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York:
Basic Books, 1974), p. 160.
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these long-established correctives as proof that interfering
with the market's distribution is not runious, contrary to
conservatives' claims. 9 Since the past remedies have been
well-received, and since the remaining inequalities still
grate, further egalitarian policies are called for.

Conser-

vative defenders of the market are left in an-untenable
position.

If they advocate discarding

th~

welfare state and

returning to laissez-faire capitalism, they can look forward
to the political success of a Barry Goldwater or an Alf

Lan~.

don. :_1'But if they accept the premises underlaying the welfare
state, conservatives implicitly agree to debate the issues of
political economy in egalitarian terms.

So it is difficult

for defenders of capitalism to influence, much less direct,
policy without violating the integrity of their principles.
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan have recently performed this balancing act well enough to win high office as
unabashed advocates of the free market.

Yet their victories

cannot be construed as signs that capitalism is no longer ·
politically vulnerable.

If there is a distinctive aspect to

the opinions of the newly triumphant conservatives, it is an
emphasis on the inefficiency of the present government
9 "Conservative" will be used throughout in the modern
American sense, designating the desire to promote laissezfaire, unless otherwise noted.

5

programs.

Promises to ferret out waste and fraud have never

had wider appeal, as even the most generous taxpayers came
to sense that the benefits to the poor and to society of an
~xpensive

welfare state are inordinately small.

Whether or

not conservatives can find major superfluities in the government remains an open question.

But whether they prove to

be skillful accountants or not, these efforts reveal the
distinct limitations of the conservatives' mandate.

If the

salient opinion of modern conservatism is that whatever
government undertakes it should do efficiently, conservatism
doesn't mean much.

Others can make the same claim.

Further,

unless skilled managers are all of the same political party,
one party's efforts to realize efficiency are likely to be
as successful as another's.
So capitalism remains morally and politically precarious.

It has an abiding capacity to engender great dis-

parities of wealth and poverty; as long as "to each as he
is chosen" is the ·rule of distribution, carrying with it the
near certainty that some will not be chosen at all, we may
expect these disparities to recur.

Nor does the widespread

aversion to capitalism's inequalities show signs of disappearing.
Given the continuing popular distaste for drastic
differences in living standards under capitalism, the problem

6

for those who make the egalitarian argument is to frame it
in such a way as to reveal clearly the connections between
popular egalitarian sentiments and a program for redistributing income.

We now turn to recent reformulations of the

egal i·tarian argument, both because these arguments themselves
are challenges to capitalism, and because they are a vehicle
capable of derailing the nascent revival of capitalism's
political fortunes.
The chief problem for egalitarians in liberal democracies is to explain what it means to be for equality.
Herbert J. Gans distinguishes the support for more equality
from that for total equality.

The latter, he says, is a

spurious issue--completely unattainable, and a straw man
created by the Right to discredit any movement toward greater
equality. 10 Redistribution is not an end in itself, but a
means to the realization of a society in which people would
have.greater power to shape their own lives.

As Michael

. Harrington writes:
The socialist.aim, at
tions, has never been
anteeing everyone the
rat race; it has been
gether. The formula,

least in its serious formulathe impossible goal of guar~
right to win in a competitive
to abolish the rat race alto"From each according to.his

10
Herbert J. Gans, More Equality (New York:
House, 1968; Vintage Press, 1974), pp. 66-68.

Random

7

ability, to each according to lli.s need_," insists upon_,
even g1ories in, human differences .....-inequalities, if
you will--once they no longer rationalize a system of
invidious competition. Socialists want to move toward
equality, in order to transcend it.~l
Michael Wa1.zer Ls article, "'In Defense of Equality, n
describes what the attainment and transcending of equality
- - 12
might involve.
Walzer begins by taking issue with Irving
Kristol, who attributes the inequalities of the market
economy to "the tryanny of the bell-shaped curve."

Human

"talents and ablli,tiesn tend to distribute themselves along
the famous bell-shaped curve, some people having meager
talents, some a great deal, most people being in-between.
Income is distributed along a similar curve, and to the extent that oneLs location in the talent distribution corresponds to oneLs spot on the income curve, the system has
a "rough fairness .. n 13 Some would question how close that
correspondence really is=' but Walzer makes a more fundamental complaint ..
llMichael Harrington, uThe Welfare State and its NeoConservative Critics,u in The New Conservatives: A Critique
·trom the Left, ed. Lewis A. Coser and Irving Howe (New York;
Quadrangle, 1974), endnot~, p. 322.
12Michae'l Walzer, "In Defense of Equality," in Coser
and Howe, pp. 107-123.
13 rrving Kristol, Two Cheers for Capitalism (New York:
Basic Books_, 1978), p .. 184.

8

There is no reason to think that "human talents and
abilities".in fact distribute themselves along a
single curve, although income necessarily does. Consider the range and varieties of human capacities:
intelligence, physical strength, agility and grace,
artistic creativity, mechanical skill, leadership,
endurance, memory, psychological insight, the capacity
for hard work--even moral strength, sensitivity, the
ability to express compassion.l~
Each of these qualities is distributed; no doubt,
along a bell-shaped curve, but there is no reason to believe
that any particular one is the key to explaining income distribution, though some are more closely correlated to that
curve than others.

But Walzer mentions an additional

quality--the ability to

make money.

While this talent in-

valves the others, it is not simply the sum of them.

Rather,

money-making is the talent to organize one's other qualities
in response to economic circumstances.

It too is distributed

along a bell-shaped curve, and it correlates very closely to
the income distribution curve.
ferences.)

(Luck accounts for any dif-

Walzer notes that this narrow skill has broad

consequences:
15
want •

--

.the ability to acquire everything one could

. The problem here is not with money-making, but money
itself.

Insisting that some other quali.ty should be the key

14Walzer, p. 109.
15

Ibid~, pp. 109-110.

9

to obtaining money would still leave certain people with
everything and others with nothing, and no talent seems so
decisive that it should be that consequential.

A morally

superior arrangement would involve allocating particular
goods to people with corresponding needs, rather than
allocating all goods on the basis of any narrow skill:
Consider the case of medical care: surely it
should not be distributed to individuals because they
are wealthy, intelligent, or righteous, but only because they are sick. Now, over any given period of
time, it may be true that some men and women won't
require any medical treatment, a very large number
will have to have_some moderate degree of attention,
and a few will have to have intensive care.
If that
is so, then we must hope for the appearance of another
bell-shaped cure. Not just any bell will. do.
It must
be the right one, echoing what might be called the
susceptibility-to-sickness curve.l6
Egalitarianism, says Walzer, is natural in the sense
that it desires that social goods should go where they are
needed and appreciated--sick people should get doctors, music
lovers music, naturalists open space, etc.
approach "the doctrine of right reasons."

He calls this
Distribution based

solely on money-making, intelligence, beauty, or any other
one thing,. is perverse because it allocates on the basis
wrong reasons.

o~

"What socialists want is a society in which

wealth is no longer convertible into social goods with which
16

Ibid., pp. 110-111.

10

it has no intrinsic connection. 17

Since it is in the nature

of money to be convertible outside its sphere, any attempt to
implement the doctrine of right reasons, such as national
health insurance, will be subverted by the tyranny of money.
(The possessors of money will be able to buy health care
beyond their ne6ds, straining the resources of the system that
delivers it to the truly needy.)

Therefore, money itself must

be distributed "more or less equally" to protect "legitimate
distribution processes." 18
Walzer's is hardly the last word on the subject of
economic equality, but it is a, ·compelling alnd fresh statement
of the Left's position.

According to Milton

Fri~dman,

one of

capitalism's most prominent defenders, "In some intellectual
circles the desirability of equal:i ty of outcome has become an
article of religious faith: everyone should finish the race
at the same time." 19 But Walzer, presumably a member of the
intellectual circles Friedman has in mind, seems very undoctrinaire in his willingness to argue his case down to the
most basic premises.

If Walzer's thoughtfulness were unique,

perhaps Friedman's charge could be sustained.

But this does

17 Ibid., p. 116.
18 Ibid., pp. 112-117.
19
Milton and.Rose Friedman, Free to Choose (New York:
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1979), p. 134.
-

11
not appear to be the case.
to Walzer's:

David Spitz makes a point similar

Equality as a moral principle does not require

the elimination of

diff~rences

among men, but the justifica-

tion of those differences in terms of the truly necessary and
just.· Spitz calls this "Equality of consideration."

It puts

the burden of proof on the defenders of inequalities, rather
than the egalitarians. 20 R.H. Tawney stressed the same point
fifty years ago:
While [men] differ profoundly as individuals in capacity and character, they are equally entitled as
human beings to consideration and respect, ••• The wellbeing of a society is likely to be increased if it so
plans its organization that, whether their powers are
great or small, all its members may be equally e~ibled
to make the best of such powers as they possess.
So, while there may be egalitarians who blindly embrace
certain doctrines, everi as there are unreflective adherents of
every faith, the suggestion that egalitarianism itself is
characteristically and thoroughly dogmatic seems unwarranted.
Nor does the conservative effort to dismiss the egalitarian
argument as the re·sul t of a major misunderstanding between
equality of opportunity and equality of result stand up. 22
20

na~id Spitz, "A Grammar of Equality," in Coser and
Howe, pp. 148-149.
21 R.H. Tawney, Equality (New York:
1931)' p. 34.
22Friedman, Free to Choose, p. 132.

Harcourt, Brace,
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In the first place, to say egalitarians wants total equality
of results is

a straw man, as already noted.

In the second

place, the reasons why_egalitarians desire greater equality
are not going to be met by equal opportunity.

Removing arti-

ficial barriers to wealth does nothing but assure the opportunity for narrow talents to command the broadest'range of
goods.

The doctrine of right reasons can hardly be satisfied

simply by eliminating the worst reasons for allocating wealth,
such as skin color.

Christopher Jencks points out that in a

certain sense, America has already achieved equality of opportunity.

His studies have shown that the degree of income

inequality between two adult brothers is likely to be the same
as between any two men chosen at random.

Since no program can

reasonably hope to provide more equality of opportunity to
children at large than what is provided children of the same
family, it would appear that if reduction of economic inequality is truly a social good, we will have to pursue it
directly, not through the mediate goal of equalizing opport

•t y. 23

un~

Furthermore, equality of opportunity is not a satis-factory substitute for the attainment of greater economic
equality, because it is not clear to what extent the one is
23

christopher Jencks et al, Inequality: A Reassessment of th~ Effect of Family and Schooling in America (New
York: Basic Books, 1972), pp. 7-8.

13
different from the other.

If the true meaning of equal oppor-

tunity is the removal of conventions that impede certain
groups, then equal opportunity can be effectively severed
from economic egalitarianism.

But if equality of opportunity

does not merely negate artificial barriers to advancement,
but positively secures the factual prerequisites by which
individuals may use all their natural abilities, the task of
equalizing opportunity is subsumed to a large degree by the
reduction of economic inequality. 24 Even the guarantee of
equal access to such essential determinants of a life's course
as nutrition, health care, and education, may not fully
equalize opportunity.

Natural inequalities are "cummulative

and self-reinforcing;" the gains and the losses of the father
25
are visited on the son.
If accidents of birth are not to
resurface as a source of inequality, equalizing opportunity
is not something a society can do just once, but will be an
ongoing effort virtually indistinguishable from the enactment
26
of the egalitarian agenda.

24. Tawney, p. 125.
25spitz, pp. 132-133.
26 see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge:
Belknap Press, 1971), pp. 65-90.

14
Finally, the Left insists that the most radical
inequality of opportunity is to be found in the self-reinforcing concentration of power and wealth in modern capitalistic societies.

Unequal opportunity is not some appendage to

capitalism, but intrinsic to a system where the insular ruling class uses power to secure its wealth andwealth to secure
its power. 27 Equality of opportunity could be an attribute of
a market economy consisting of shopowners.and craftsmen.

But

it is incompatible with the logic of corporate capitalism
where millions of lives are altered by the decisions of a very
few people.
To repeat, economic inequality is the chief source of
capitalism's vulnerability.

The widespread disaffection for

the contract between indecent high living and indecent low living is the material cause.

But, as we have seen, a more

sophisticated critique of the free market continues, and its
fashioners await the chance to shape popular resentment into
a politically consequential force.

Whether the egalitarian

brief against capitalism is sound or not, it is deserving of
serious attention, both :(or its political implications andits capacity to perpetuate capitalism's defensive posture as
a morally illegitimate system.
27

.
Tawney, _pp. 71-72

15
It receives such attention in the writings of Friedriech A. von Hayek.
pursuit of this

Though an economist by profession, whose

caree~_resulted

in a Nobel prize in 1974, and

who has insisted he attaches greater importance to his
,;
28
.
economic work than any other,
Hayek has developed a defense
of capitalism over the past thirty-five years.

This defense

is not primarily that of an economist but of a political
theorist.

Hayek's argument on behalf of the market economy

rests on a theory of the proper role of government, the true
nature of law, and on society's capacity to order itself
spontaneously.

Hayek is widely acknowledged as one of the
most compelling defenders of the free market. His political
works have greatly increased the rhetorical vocabulary of
capitalism's advocates, and been :enthusiastically received
by them.

29

Hayek has given lengthy, careful attention to the
egalitarian indictment of capitalism, and clearly considers
it to be an issue of great importance.

If we carefully

examine Hayek's defense of capitalism, with special emphasis
on his treatment of capitalism's distribution of wealth, we

28
.
Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road 'l'o Serfdom (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1944), -p. x.
29
George C. Roche III, "The Rele~ance of Friedrich A.
Hayek," in Essays on Hayek, ed. Fritz Machlup, with a fore. word by Milton Friedman (New York: New York University Press,
1976), pp. 10-11.

16

will be in a better position to assess the degree to which
capitalism is discredited by egalitarian arguments and
sentiments.

This examination of Hayek's defense of the mar-

ket will contribute ultimately to an understanding of the
market's defensibility.

We will first consider such key

concepts in Hayek's argument as freedom, progress, law, order,
and government's proper role, examining how they contribute
to Hayek's rebuttal of egalitarianism.

Then we will consider

the implications of Hayek's arguments in terms of social cohesion and moral order, to see if, in the attempt to refute
the egalitarian critique, Hayek has adopted otherwise dubious
positions. ·.Finally, this thesis will review the debate over
capitalism's distribution processes in light of Hayek's contribution.

CHAPTER TWO
FREEDOM AND PROGRESS
Friedrich Hayek's defense of the

m~trket

economy's

distribution of income starts from the sober acknowledgment
that that distribution does indeed offend modern notions of
decency.

By declining to pursue the tempting but unsatis-

factory course of insisting that people must somehow adjust
their consciences to modern realities, Hayek prepares to
enter the issue of incomE! distribution at the truly central
point.

Hayek even admits that his own sense of justice is

not entirely comfortable with all of capitalism's results:
.The results of • • • remuneration according to
the value of the product m;ust appear as highly unjust
from the point of view of distributive justice. It
will rarely correspond to what we regard as the sub. jective merit of a performance. That the speculator
. who by chance has guessed correctly may earn a fortune
in a few hours while the life-long efforts of an inventor who has been anticipated by another by a few
days remains [sic] unremunerated, or that the hard
work of the peasant who clings to his soil barely
brings him enough to.keep going, while a man who en. joys writing detective stories thereby earns enough to
afford a luxurious life, will appear unjust to most
people. I understand the dissatisfaction produced by
the daily observation of such cases and honour the
feeling which calls for distributive justice.· If it
were a question of whether fate or some omnipotent and
omniscient power should reward people according to the
~---· ---~

17

-· - - -
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principles of commutative or according to the principles of distributive justice, .we should probably all
choose the latter.30
Except for the (characteristically) dispassionate
language, one might suppose the foregoing to be a passage from
an indictment of capitalism for its endemic injustice.

We get

the first hint of how Hayek plans to dissociate himself from
egalitarianism when he makes his approval of distributive justice conditional upon distribution by "fate or some omnipotent
and omniscient power."

In fact, there are no such powers,

says Hayek, and the entire egalitarian argument is based on
the premise that we can do something about the distribution
of income, rather than accepting it as fated.

By this caveat,

Hayek indicates that he will insist on comparing the market to
real alternatives, not to ideal ones that might tacitly presuppose omniscience for their operation.

The course of Hayek's

argument will be to insist that despite the defects of its
income distribution, the market is, on balance, superior to
.

.

the available alternatives, correctly perceived.

Capitalism

is desirable for Hayek, as democracy was desirable for Winston
Churchill, largely

becaus~

the alternatives are all inferior.

To analyze Hayek's argument, then, is to discern Hayek's
characterization of capitalism and his view of the alternatives to capitalism, and to see why he prefers the former.
30 F.A. Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics, and
Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 257.

19
The ultimate concern of Hayek's political philosophy,
towards which everything else in it is directed, is progress.
Progress, he feels, is_the essence of civilization; sometimes
he uses the two words almost interchangeably.

"The preserva-

tion of the kind of civilization that we know depends on the
operation of forces which, under favorable conditions, pro31

According to C.S. Lewis~ "Progress means
32
getting nearer to the place where you want to be."
Hayek's
duce progress."

notion of progres·s is emphatically different, lacking any
teleological imperative.

It is by "living in and for the

future [that] human intelligence proves itself.
movement for movement's sake • • •

Progress is

33

Hayek's view of progress rests on two premises.

First,

individuals have an infinite array of desires and interests.
Any attempt to speak of a society progressing involves the
reduction of the goals of each member of society to some
broad general desires.
warranted.

Hayek feels this consolidation is un-

Individuals' goals have a concreteness that makes

~,.A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 39-40.
.

31

32

c.s. Lewis, Mere Christianity (New York:
1943; Macmillan Paperbacks, 1960), p. 36 •
. 33

Hayek, Constitution, p. 41.

Macmillan,

20
movement towards them meaningful, while talk of "society's
34
goals" is always hopelessly amorphous.
Hayek complains
that this

particulari~tic

emphasis on what individuals want

ia interpreted, often and wrongly, as an endorsement of
crass selfishness.
any sort of egoism.

Hayek insists that he does not profess
Emphatically included irr the goals

individuals will want to pursue are the altruistic or charitable, which do not benefit them except by the satisfaction
they derive from helping others. 35
The second premise of Hayek's understanding of progress is that each individual knows more about what he wants
and dislikes, what he can and cannot do, than anyone else.
Hayek refers to this phenomenon as the "division of knowledge," and considers it as least as important to the understanding of social processes as the far more famous division
of labor.

The problem of the division of knowledge, from

the point of view of a social scientists, is to find out how
millions of people can interact in a complex society when
each one of· them only knows a little bit about the desires of
of others, the possibilities open to him, the chances of a.
34
35

Ibid., p. 40 and note 4, p. 429.
Ibid., pp. 78-80

21
venture's success, etc.

36

From the perspective of the

legislator, who wants to formulate beneficial government
policies, the division of knowledge constitutes a boundary
to what the government is able to do or what it needs to do.
Policies that presuppose gathering and digesting comprehensive data about the functioning of society are definitely
suspect.

Such efforts will never come near "the knowledge

of particular circumstances of"time and place," possessed
by each individual.
greatly diffused.

Such knowledge is terribly useful and
Everyone has a body of knowledge which

no other person possesses entirely, so everyone is able to
make unique contributions and calculations. 37

This disper-

sion of knowledge is crucial to Hayek's point of view:
It is impossible for any man to survey more than a
limited field, to be aware of the urgency of more
than a limited number of needs • • • • This is the
fundamental fact on which the whole philosophS of
individualism [Hayek's philosophy] is based.3
Hayek's stress on the division of knowledge gives his
treatment of liberty a unique coloring.
36

According to Hayek:

F.A. Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1947), p. 50.
37
38

Ibid., pp. 80-81.

Hayek, Road to Serfdom, p. 59.

22
The case for individual liberty rests chiefly on the
recognition of the inevitable ignorance of all of us
concerning a great many of the factors on which the
achievement of our ends and welfare depends. • • • If
there were omniscient men, if we could know not only
all that affects-the attainment of our present wishes
but also our future wants and desires, there would be
little case for liberty.39
By asserting that liberty has little intrinsic importance,
Hayek takes a different approach than other defenders of
capitalism.

Milton Friedman, for example, calls freedom the
40
"ultimate goal in judging social arrangements."
Some stu-

dents of Hayek have failed to note his pragmatic approach to
liberty, and treated him as a classical liberal whose views
41
are the same as Friedman's.
This error may be attributable
to the fact that Hayek's writings often appeal to an assumed
concern for liberty; his first and most famous book, The Road
to Serfdom, did not try to argue 'that Hitler was evil because
he had stifled progress--Hayek proceeded on the understanding
that Naziism was repugnant to his audience.

Nonetheless,

. when Hayek speaks directly of freedom, he always stresses its
role in furthering progress.
39Hayek, Constitution, p. 29.
4 °Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, p. 12.
41

. .
.
See Gottfried Dietze, "Hayek on the Rule of Law," in
Machlup, p. 114 • . See also .Morris M. Wilhelm, "The Political
Thought of Friedrich A. Hayek," Political Studies 20 (June
1972): 169.
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But how does freedom facilitate progress?

The answer,

in brief, is that it transforms the division of knowledge
from a cause of chaos

-~n

a large society to a source of order •

.If we tried to organize society from.the center, the sheer
volume of things we could not know, changes we could not
anticipate, would frustrate us at every turn.- By allowing individuals to pursue various enterprises, based on their own
assessments of the prospects for these efforts, we remove the
necessity for centralized direction of society.

As Hayek says:

We want the individual to have liberty because only if
he can decide what to do can he also use all his unique
combination of information, skills and capacities which
nobody else can fully appreciate. To enable the individual to fulfil his own potential we must also allow
him to act on his own estimates of the various chances
and probabilities. Since. we do not know what he knows,
. we cannot decide whether his decisions were justified;
nor can we know whether his success or failure was due
to his efforts and foresight, or to good luck.42
By liberty, Hayek refers to "that condition in which
coercion of some by others is reduced to a minimum." 43
·Coercion, in turn, is "such control of the environment of a person by another that, in order to avoid a greater evil, he is
forced to act, not according to a coherent plan of his own but
t o serve the ends ' of anot h er." 44

42

. 43
44

Does this mean that if my

Hayek, Studies, p. 233 •
Hayek, Constitution, p. 11.
Ibid., pp. 20-21.
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employer will not give me the raise I desire, forcing me to
abandon the coherent plan I had to buy a new car, that he
has coerced me and dep!ived me of my freedom?
.Hayek.

No, says

He elaborates his definition, saying that liberty

culminates in the assurance of a sphere of unfettered action
wherein each citizen is immune to interference by others.
An indispensible part of that sphere is the right to own
45
private property and dispose of it as one chooses.
A
tight-fisted

empl~yer

does not transgress my sphere, does

not coerce me, as a thief certainly does.

Moreover, while

the employer may force me to make the unpleasant choice to
find other employment, this is not comparable to acting on
pain of injury or death. 46 Finally, according to Hayek,
liberty does not mean the ability to do whatever one desires.
The fact of coercion cannot be equated with circumstances of
limited funds, talents, or resources, though both may prevent the realization of some personal goa1. 47
A state. devoid of coercion would be the ideal, but
because of man's demonstrated propensity to act against
others, the realistic goal calls for minimizing coercion,
not eliminating it.
45

46
47

Minimizing coercion requires th·e

Ibid., pp. 137-143.
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 16-17.
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existence of a government which possesses coercive powers
itself, and uses them to dissuade individuals bent on transgressing the protected_sphere of others.

If this government

·is to diminish rather than exacerbate the problem of coercion,
the scope of its powers must be clearly limited.

"The limi-

tation of all coercion to the enforcement of-general rules
of just conduct was the fundamental principle of classical
liberalism, or, I would almost say, its definition of
liberty." 48 (Hayek considers his own views consonant with
those of classical liberalism.)

The "general rules of just

conduct" will be considered in the discussion of Hayek's
philosophy of law in Chapter Three.

In Chapter Four we will

study the nature of the limitations Hayek would place on
government.

For the time being, we will regard Hayek's

notion of a free society as being similar to the nightwatchman state.

In such a society each citizen has legal status

as a protected member of the community, immunity from arbitrary arrest, the· right to work at whatever he decides to do,
the right to movement as he chooses, and the right to own
property. 49
48 F.A. Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics,
Economics, and the History of Ideas (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1978), p. 109.
49

Hayek, Constitution, p. 20.
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The leading characteristic of a free society that
makes the division of knowledge a source of social order
rather than an

obstacl~

to it is the price system in a com-

petitive market economy.

The price system reflects how much

people want things and how easily they are acquired.

Know-

ledge of the price of a good or service obviates the need
for trying to find out who wants what, where i t can be
50
obtained, how i t can be delivered; and so.on.
Adam Smith
announced that the division of labor was the chief cause of
51
the wealth of nations.
But Hayek feels the Smith's
venerable pin factory example misleadingly suggests that the
most important division of labor goes on within ·a single
firm, when in fact the division of labor among firms is the
real source of prosperity.

'

The passage to modern society is

the story of prices rather than rules coming to direct productive activities.

As this change took place, says Hayek,

societies grew more prosperous.

Everyone in society, not

just the rulers, was able to ascertain and act upon the facts
that might produce wealth, so i t was pursued more energetically and more flexibly.

It became worthwhile to specialize

50
Hayek, Individualism, pp. 85-86.
51

Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of
the Wealth of Nations, ed. Edwin Canaan, with an Introduction
by Max Lerner (New York: Modern Library, 1937), pp. 3-12.
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in the production of certain goods, concentrating on gaining
knowledge about the demand for these things and the way to
supply them.

The

gene~al

prosperity, he concludes, is a

result of the greatly increased opportunities individuals
. ·t o ac h"1eve
.
f"1nanc1a
. 1 success. 52
h ave

The price system is the leading example of the capacity of a society to spontaneously order itself.

A small

group, such as a tribe or a village, is simple enough that
most of the social processes can be directed by a central
authority.

But the expansion of the scope of civilization

to include profitable interaction among a larger number of
people required that this authority be superseded.

Hayek

thinks that the initial desire to limit government can be
traced to the simple desire to reduce the chances of being
bullied or coerced.

But the discovery that a diminution of

government set loose forces that spontaneously generated a
desirable social order was the beginning of the modern
53
attachment to liberty.
The very idea of social, as opposed
to tribal, order carries with it the process of reconciling
diverse wants and knowledge.

52Hayek, New Studies, pp. 62-63.
53

'

In a social order, Hayek says:

Hayek, Studies, pp. 161-162.
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Individuals are able, on the basis of their own
respective peculiar knowledge, to form expectations
concerning the conduct of others, which are proved
correct by making possible a successful mutual adjustment of the actions of these individuals.54
Though Hayek is conspicuous among contemporary
political theorists in extolling the spontaneous order, he
regards himself as being only a disciple of the 18th century
philosophers, such as Mandeville, Hume, Josiah Tucker,
Montesquieu, Adam Ferguson, and Smith, who reacted against
the "constructive rationalism" associated with Cartesian
philosophy by emphasizing the degree to which society could
spontaneously order itself.

Smith's "invisible hand" may

have been an excessive claim that the spontaneously generated
order was always the best possible.

But, Hayek says, Smith

was like all the others in seeing that society progressed
when "less effective" institutions or practices were displaced by those more effective at the "reconciliation of di.

verse interests."

55

Bernard de Mandeville was not the most

penetrating of these thinkers, but he was the first to grasp
the key insight:
His main contention became simply that in the complex
order of society the results of men's actions were very different from what they had intended, and that
the individuals, in pursuing their own ends, whether
54
55

Hayek, New Studies, p. 9. (Italics mine.)
Hayek, Studies, pp. 99-101.
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selfish or altruistic, produced useful results for
others which they did not anticipate or perhaps even
know;_and finally that the whole order of society,
and even all that we call culture, was the result of
individual strivings which had no such end in view,
but were channeled to serve such ends by institutions,
practices, and rules which also had never been
deliberately invented but had grown up by the survival
of what proved successful.56
-

The price system is a noteworthy example of society's
capacity to order itself spontaneously, but it is not the
only one.

The existence and growth of language is an even

more profound demonstration of man's capacity to create useful means of mutual accommodation without any pre-existing
57
master plan.
Hayek offers language and the price system as
proof of the excessive rigidity of the dichotomy between
nature and convention that he traces back to the ancient
58
Greeks.
Hayek claims that David Hume outlined a middle
category to be applied to spontaneous developments such as
the price system or language, that were neither instinctive
nor contrived.

These social phenomena were the results of

human action but not of human design, and as such should be
56 Hayek, New Studies, p. 253.
57Hayek,- Studies, p. 72.
58
Hayek,
~' pp. 96-98,
lism," in Left,
(Chicago: Rand

New Studies, pp. 4-6. See also Hayek, Studand Joseph Cropsey, "Conservatism and LiberaRight, and Center, ed. Robert A Goldwin
McNally, 1967), p. 44.
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accorded a quasi-natural status, and not derided as arbitrary
arrangements subject to change whenever we might like. 59
The spontaneous ,order makes government intervention in
the economy to achieve the production and distribution of
goods unnecessary.

The more telling assertion is the govern-

ment intervention in the spontaneous order is-positively harmful.

Hayek writes:
The reason why • • • isolated commands requiring specific actions by members of the spontaneous order can
never improve but must disrupt that order is that they
will refer to a part of a system of interdependent
actions determined by information and guided by purposes known only to the several acting persons but not
to the directing authority. The spontaneous order
arises from each element balancing all the various
factors operating on it and by adjusting all its various actions to each other, a balance which will be
destroyed if some of the actions are determined by
another agency on the basis of different knowledge and
in the service of different ends.60

Where societies are spontaneously. ordered, the intrusion of
centralized commands upon them does not solidify order, but
creates uncertainty and confusion.

People try to adjust to

the new set of circumstances without knowing if they are
permanent or temporary, or whether or not more central orders
will follow. 61

59Hayek, New Studies, pp. 4-6.
· 6 °F.A. Hayek, Law Legislation, and Liberty, 3 vols.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), vol. 1: Rules
and Order, p. 51.
· 61 Hayek, Constitution, pp. 150-161.
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But the production and consumption of goods and services is not the only aspect of social life that orders
itself spontaneously. '-In the longer run, the very existence
of society depends upon the spontaneous emergence of needed
values and institutions.

While Hayek denies that a society
-

as such can progress, since it is not an entity that can
have goals, in the process of changing to meet the changing
desires of its members, a society--that is, the whole array
of regularities that constitutes the public life of a
society--will evolve.

This evolution is the most important

instance of the coordination of individual and social orderliness; individual desires elicit complementary actions by
others, and those actions that do the best job of satisfying
the wants come to characterize the social order.

Whether or

not particular aspects of a social order persist depends on
their contribution to the vitality of the group.

When cer-

tain values or institutions are in conflict at the margin,
the people of the' society must gravitate towards one or the
other.

Those practices that contribute to the long-term

continuity and growth of a social order will become more
common, while groups that choose practices unconducive to
such continuity will disappear, taking their distinctive
social characteristics with them. 62
62
Hayek, Studies, p. 77.
PP. 19-20.

See also Hayek, New Studies,
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Hayek is at pains to deny that his ideas of social
evolution resemble what he regards as the excesses of Social
Darwi.nism.

Hayek • s

co1~cern

is with the evolution of a
.ci~ilization •s customs and institutions. 63 According to

Hayek, Social Darwinism erred by concentrating on the natural
selection of individuals, and on innate rather than acquired
. t•1.cs. 64
c h arac t er1.s

Hayek says that culture evolves as unsuc-

cessful groups immitate successful ones, or are assimilated
65
by them.
So subtle is this process that it is not even
necessary that the qualities that cause a particular group
to thrive be known to its members, new or old.

Without in-

tending to, they will embrace these practices in· the process
of socialization.

(Hayek's most important book, The Consti-

tution of Liberty, is dedicated

t~

"the unknown civilization

that is growing in America.")
From a foundation that incorporates the intrinsic
desirability of progress, the ineluctable division of knowledge, and the necessity of freedom for making the latter
spontaneously generate the former,.Hayek proceeds to dispute
the egalitarian indictment of the market.

63Hayek, New Studies, pp. 67-68.
64

65

Hayek~

Rules and Order, p. 23.

Ibid., note 7, p. 169.

He will do so by.·
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insisting that the groups for whom the Left is especially
solicitous--the poor and the working classes--are better
off under the market than they are after the reforms proposed
by its critics.

The restrictions on the market cause a loss

in economic vitality that affects the entire society, including the poor, adversely.

They also distort values, encourag-

ing beliefs and practices that are harmful to the whole
society, including, and perhaps especially, the poor.

As

Hayek states:
Men can be allowed to act on their own knowledge and
for their own purposes only if the reward they obtain
is dependent in part on circumstances which they can
neither control nor forsee. And if they are to be
allowed to be guided in their actions by their own
moral beliefs, it cannot also be required that the
aggregate effects of their respective actions on the
different people should correspond to some ideal of
distributive justice. In this sense freedom is inseparable from rewards which often have no connection
with merit and are therefore felt to be unjust.6 6
Hayek stresses that rearranging the results of the
market economy on behalf of the poor is likely to prove harmful to them in the long run.

He goes so far as to say that

the main benefits of freedom are not in exercising it, but
in living in a society

w~ere

freedom constantly engenders

progress in ways that could not have been forseen or·planned. 67
· 66 F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, vol. 2:
· The Mirage of Social Justice, p. 120.
· 67Hayek, _fonstitution, pp. 31-32.
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For example, an affluent class is able to experiment with
new forms of living and consumption which may "catch on;" if
so, new sectors of the__ economy will emerge, providing new
jobs, and products once considered luxuries, like cars and
televisions, will become ubiquitous.
if the advances now pioneered by the

Conversely, says Hayek,
affluen~were,

as a

matter of policy withheld until they were universally available, most would never be

realized at a11.

68

Progress

re~

quires ample scope for the exploration of the odd but intriguing possibilities, for serendipity, for following hunches,
and no comprehensive government program can allow these
things the latitude to be found among free men pursuing
private visions.

According to Hayek, redistribution may make

the poor better off in the short run, but the long-term consequences of stifling the creativity of the more affluent
.
69
classes limits the chances the poor have of escaping poverty.
The prerequisite for any distribution is a vibrant economy,
but this requi~es entrepreneurs who will endure great risks,
and who will come forth only if they might achieve great
rewards.

Confiscate such rewards and there will be less risk. .
70
taking and fewer breakthroughs in new goods and serv~ces.
68
69

.
Ib1d., pp. 42-44
Ibid., pp. 48-49.

70
Hayek, New Studies, pp. 64-65.
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In the market things are produced by those who can
do so-cheaply, since the incentives to take markets away
from expensive producers are strong.

In many cases the

results of the market's operation are unsatisfactory and we
feel that simple changes could correct the situation.

But

such efforts reveal that it is extremely difficult for the
government to do just one thing.

The political and admini-

strative logic of the situation· draws the government into a
broad-ranging and protracted effort, that may result in one
thing being done better than it would have been done by the
market, and a thousand things being done worse.

71

For ex-

ample, rent control, public housing, and slum clearance are
all activities that begin with modest and laudable aims, but
which,

once begun,

are almost i~possible to stop or con-

tain because of the political expectations they engender.
· Rent control continues long after a housing crisis is over,
and public housing and slum clearance involve many more
beneficiaries than originally planned, including many who
are economically self-sufficient but politically powerfu1. 72
"While. we used to suffer from social evils, we now suffer
from the remedies for
71

the~." 73

Ibid., p. 185.

7 2 Hayek, Constitution, pp. 343-349.
.•J.

73

Ibid. , p. 304.

·
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Even in the extreme case of people who work in jobs
that are both low-paid and unpleasant, Hayek contends that
their lot is better than it would be under available alter.·natives, as opposed to ideal ones.

It is not a social in-

justice that people who hold unpleasant jobs make much less
than those with interesting and enjoyable ones.

Salaries

reflect the value the market places on the work performed
by the salaried employee.

The odiousness of the job affects

this equation only to the extent that it encourages those
. who can to seek other jobs, reducing the supply of laborers,
and putting upward pressure on the wage.

The important thing

is that people who clean sewers have more alternatives to
gain higher pay or seek other employment than they would in
other systems, where the cost of good intentions that might
ameliorate the worker's lot is an unwieldly, stagnant economy
that, at the very least, greatly complicates his efforts to
. own pos1•t•1on. 74
b e tt er h 1s
The sort of egalitarianism that Hayek favors is the
·type endorsed by most of the defenders of the market.
·Equality, to Hayek, means the absence of legal privil_eges or
government-secured advantages.

It means the negative enforce-

ment of equal opportunity, the removal of artifical obstacles
to anyone's career, but not the positive effort to try to
74 Hayek, Mirage, pp. 91-93.
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equalize everyone's "starting point." 75

The unavoidable

fact is that the conjunction of equality before the law and
unequal natural endowments results in unequal social and
economic conditions.

Inequality of wealth and prestige in-

evitably accompanies freedom in a society of unique individuals.

76

To try to reverse this fact of nature requires exten-

sive and constant government action on behalf of every individual--a role for government antithetical to freedom.

77

Hayek sees·a second difficulty with the effort to
realize the egalitarian vision.

In a market economy, people

receive economic rewards for the ruthlessly pragmatic reason
that they have satisfied some desire.

No moral judgment on

whether they were morally deserving of their wealth is implied by these transactions, .beyond the belief that sellers
of goods or services are entitled to the price their buyers
have voluntarily agreed to.

Some people will engage in

after-the-fact rationalizations, claiming that differences
in industriousness or foresight explain and justify the differences between the rich and poor.

Hayek insists that this

moral judgment is wrongly. applied to capitalism, and is not.
75Hayek, New Studies, pp. 141-142.
·~ Hayek, Constitution, pp. 8 5-88.

77 Ibid., pp. 92-93.
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a part of the logic of the system:
In our society personal esteem and material success
are much too closely bound together. We ought to be
much more aware-that if we regard a man as entitled
to a high material reward that in itself does not
necessarily entitle him to high esteem. And, though
we are often confused on this point, it does not mean
that this confusion is a necessary result of the
enterprise system--or that in general the free enterprise system is more materialistic than other social
orders.78
The distinction between material entitlement and moral
desert, always possible in a market economy though not always
practiced, is completely untenable in a system where economic
activity, including the distribution of income, is directed
by a central authority.

That authority must make allocation

decisions according to selected criteria of desert; Hayek says
that to wind up at the bottom of ·that distribution is not
only to suffer physical deprivation but to be stigmatized as
a least deserving citizen.

Economic circumstances, in these
economic systems, inevitably imply moral judgments. 79
In addition to the devitalization of the economy,
which. will harm the poor, and the corruption of the ideal of
equality, which will humiliate them, departures from the market establish precedents that cannot easily be repealed.
78

Hayek, Studies, p. 234.

79
Hayek, Constitution, pp. 95-99.
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Hayek sees it, the fecundity of the market economy results
from its participants' attitude that they must constantly
strive to satisfy the desires of others as expressed through
·the price system.

If people generally held the contrary

opinion that they were entitled to a decent living, or the
continuity of some previous standard of living, even if the
skill they wish to exercise is no longer demanded, the
economy would perform much worse.

Of course, to strive is

not always to succeed, since the division of knowledge prevents anyone from knowing all the obstacles and opportunities confronting him.

The market, then, is "a mixed game of

skill and chance.," the playing of which increases everyone's
chance to prosper without guaranteeing anyone a particular
.
80
1 eve 1 o f 1ncome.
Once we get the government.involved in the process of
redistributing the winnings, it is extremely difficult to
continue the game.

People perceive that the satisfaction

of economic wants· is of diminished importance to gaining
. wealth; what really matters is the exercise of political
power. · The progress of government intervention in the
economy encourages, and is encouraged by, the shift ·in.human
enterprise from the economic to the political arena.
80Hayek, Studies, pp. 174-175.

More
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and more of the efforts once devoted to satisfying the
demands for goods and services are now given over to lobby. .
d
i ng, b arga1n1ng, an

.

.

c~pa1gn1ng.

81

Furthermore, Hayek believes that government intervention ·in the economy contributes to a false, anthropomorphic
view of society.

The "primitive" instinct to-think of the

social unit as an entity, rather than as a collection of
individual entities, is relfected most clearly in the discussion of economic distribution. 82 The call for a fairer
income distribution is usually expressed in terms of distributive or social justice.

Hayek objects:

There can be no distributive justice where no one
distributes. Justice has meaning only as a rule of
human conduct, and no conceivable rules for the conduct of individuals supplying each other with goods
and services in a market economy would produce a
distribution which could be meaningfully described
as just or unjust.8 3
If society were a person whose actions included parcelling
out. wealth, then it would be reasonable to insist that he do
so in accord with certain moral precepts.

But no such pre-

cepts can be formulated that would guide the interactions of
millions of people, who, needless to say, do not know one

81Hayek, New Studies, p. 64.

See also F.A. Hayek,
· Law, Legislation, and Liberty, vol. 3: The Political Order
of a Free People, p. 138 •
. 82

Hayek, Rules and Order, p. 9.

83 Hayek, New Studies, p. 58.
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• . . one ano th er. 84
. t en t•1ons v1s-a-v1s
anot h er an d h ave no 1n
As Hayek sees it, every redistributive corrective
diminishes to one extent or another the values and

arrange~

ments by which whole societies have only recently emerged
from a history of poverty.

Such an accomplishment deserves

greater respect and fewer reforms.

We can see how deep

Hayek's commitment to the market and its distributive process is by considering his support of the role of the
"ability to make money," derided by Walzer.

It is a fact,

Hayek says, that a free society of modern complexity will
often favor the person who knows how to package and sell his
skills over an equally skilled person who waits for those
demanding his services to find him.

Though this emphasis on

pragmatic resourcefulness if.often bitterly resented, it is
· entirely appropriate that it should be rewarded.

The market

economy does not merely use skills, it uses them in an
infinite and changing variety of ways.

Men contribute to

others not just· by having a skill, but by finding its best
·employment.

That economic rewards should reflect this fact
85
is both predictable and desirable.

85
Hayek, Constitution, pp. 80-83.
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Because Hayek disavows any view of society as a collective, his discussion of the role of the ability to make
money is in terms of its usefulness to individuals.

Walzer

takes what Hayek would probably call an anthropomorphic
posture by discussing how the "system rewards" money-making
-

abilities.

Walzer's stress on the aggregate has certain

paternalistic implications.

We could criticize democracy

along the lines Walzer uses to criticize capitalism:

In a

well-governed society, political power would be exercised by
men and women with certain important qualities--eloquence,
organizational ability, prudence, courage, and integrity, to
name only some.

Yet in a democracy those who possess "the

. vote-getting ability," a quality distinct from these others,
are the ones who wind up with political power.

Walzer's

argument that people don't get the economy they want or ought
to want from the money-makers is analagous to the claim that
they don't get the polity they want or ought to want from
the vote-getters.

Each contention rests on the premise that

the people's real preferences or best interests are known to
certain people, whose acquisition of power is sufficient t.o
do what the people want and need might well be a happy
occasion.
The thrust of Walzer's argument went beyond the assertion that .sharp-eyed businessmen were the most likely beneficiaries of capitalism.

His larger

clai~

was that even if

43
we knew the true moral desert of each

individual~

distribut-

ing wealth accordingly would not guarantee that human needs
received the attention-and the economic resources they deserved.

Only the implementation of the doctrine of right

reasons, where particular goods correspond to particular
needs can do that.

Hayekts conception of egalitarianism

does not seem to extend to Walzerts doctrine.

Rather, Hayek

views the egalitarian effort as an attempt to make receipt
correspond to the moral desert of producers, their dedication, diligence, and so forth.

{See above,

IPP~

17-18]).

In this regard, Hayekts argument may be insufficient for
meeting

Wal~erts

important codicil to the egalitarian

critique.
But we find even graver problems if we bring Hayek 1 s
insistence on comparing programs rather than ideals to bear
on Walzerts argument..

Hayek says that nthough a great many

people are dissatisfied with the existing pattern of distribution, none of tliem has really any clear idea of what pat86
tern he would regard as just."
Walzert.s idea of to each
according to his needs may be clear enough, but whether his
program for realizing it, protecting legitimate distributive
processes such as national health insurance by distributing
income more or less equally, will succeed is open to question.
86Hayek, New Studies, p. 58.
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Even more worrisome is the propsect of harsh side-effects from
the Walzer program..

The disincentive effects on production

that concern Hayek a

gl"~at

deal are not mentioned by Walzer.

Arguably., that is a technicality too abtruse for a single
article on the ethical ideal of economic equality.

But even

a short article should not argue for matching goods with
needs without showing that sufficient goods of the desired
types are available, or suggesting how they might be produced,

-

or mentioning how the government should face the difficult
allocative decisions if the goods are not available.

These

are the sort of questions Hayek£s argument about comparing
real alternatLves raises, and the sort that Walzerts argument
does not answer ..

rt we are to judge Hayek by this standard of real
alternatLves, then we cannot yet accept his contention that
cpaitalism is the best available. The resiliency of the
market

economy~.

both as an economi.c system and a social

structure, is still undetermined.

If it can withstand a

number of changes, then departures from it may not be so distressing as Hayek suggests.

In Chapter Three we will con-

Sider Hayekr:s argument about law, whlc.h is his argument
about the delicacy of the spontaneous order.

In Chapter

Four we will see what sort of efforts on behalf of the poor
are consistent with the preservation of the spontaneous
order.

CHAPTER THREE
KNOWN LAWS AND AN UNKNOWN ORDER

Hayek wishes to argue that retaining capitalism will
iasure every member of society a better chance to avoid
poverty than altering or abolishing the market.

He realizes

why his task is extremely difficult; people who profit from
government intervention in the economy have tangible evidence
of their benefits·.

The recipient of the government support

check, or the worker in a tariff-protected industry, is fully
aware that he owes his present standard of living to a government effort.

But the costs of intervening in the market

economy, and the benefits of its unimpeded progress, are less
easily discerned.

We appreciate the jobs saved by the tariff;

we don't notice the funds diverted to artificially competitive domestic goods, or the loss of the productive capacities
that might have been created had we been able to buy the
cheapter imported goods and devote the residual funds to
.
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o th er purposes.
The burden of

Hay~k's

philosophical writings, then, is

to remind people of the less obvious facts, to appri·se them
of the less tangible benefits available from the market.
87
.
Hayek, Eules and Order, pp. 56-57.
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Hayek must, like Tocqueville, for whom he frequently expresses his admiration, inculcate a sort of "self-interest,
rightly understood."
~arly

Although Hayek's teaching is particu-

inaccessible, requiring a sophisticated understanding

of economic cause and effect that few people possess, he is
determined that his own writing should counterbalance widely
held beliefs.

Hayek seems to have had his own work in mind

when he wrote, "There is, • • • never so much reason for the
political philosopher to suspect himself of failing in his
task as when he finds that his opinions are very popular."

88

We can be more precise about Hayek's view of his
philosophical writings.

He has written:

It is the nurturing of the spontaneous forces of
freedom that truly constitutes a service to society-to that which has grown, as distinct from that which
has been deliberately created--and to the further
strengthening of the creative forces of the social
process J~9 ·
Assuming that Hayek hopes his writings will "truly constitute a service to society," we may conclude that the ultimate
goal of his philosophy is to nurture the spontaneous order,
a task which will regularly put him at odds with the more
popular calls for reconstructing that order.
88

Hayek, Constitution, p. 115.

89Hay~k, Studies, pp. 246-247.
--~
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But if society does indeed have the capacity to order
itself spontaneously, what does it mean to nurture this process, why is nurturing-necessary at all, and how does it
differ from the sort of outside interference that impedes
progress?

To understand Hayek's theory of law is to under-

stand the nurturing of the spontaneous order,-because Hayek
regards the law as the most important device for "strengthening the creative forces of the social process."
We may begin to understand Hayek's theory of law by
noting his definition of order:
A state of affairs in which a multiplicity of elements
of various kinds are so related to each other that we
may learn from our acquaintance with some spatial or
temporal part of the whole to form correct expectations
concerning the rest, or at least expectations which
have a good chance of proving correct.90
Order, then, does not require uniformity, only that diversity
does not overwhelm us.

When Hayek says that we have experi-

enced progress he does not mean that societies are more
easily comprehensible because they are simpler.

Rather, it

is possible to comprehend an ever smaller portion of the
social order and still pursue one's goals.

The advance of

civilization is characterized by an increase in the number of
important operations that can be performed without thinking
about them. 91

90Hayek, Rules and Order, p. 36.
91 Hayek, Individualism, pp. 88-89.
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For thousands of years groups of hunters were the
highest form of social organization.

Under these circum-

stances, says Hayek, every aspect of life was secondary to
the pursuit of the common prey.

The social imperatives were

so st'rong as to erase any real individuality.

It was not

until the first tentative exchanges of food or tools between
members of different tribal groups that the possibility of a
different life was conceivable.

Community membership no

longer. had to be the decisive fact of life, and the notion
of individual goals, distinct from the community's, and to
which the collective teleology might have to accede, was
first realized.

A new sort of social organization was pos-

sible, characterized by mutual.satisfaction of individual
goals rather than collective pursuit of common goals.

The

process of social evolution caused these new societies to
displace the older, teleologically constricted ones. 92
The emergence of this new society made the existence
of laws both possible and necessary.

Possible, because hav-

ing come to understand the intrinsic worth of individual
goals, men perceive that
unnecessary.

~

society organized by commands is

When the pursuit of the common goal was· all-

important, directives by the leadership to coordinate that
92 Hayek, New Studies·, pp. 58-62; and Hayek, Studies,
p. 70.
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pursuit were necessary.

Now that central superintendence of

social life is not necessary, the government's directives can
be of a prohibitory nature, defining what can't be done, but
capable of being obeyed in a variety of ways, rather than
positive commands.

The new society made laws necessary be-

cause the old society's source of order, central commands,
had been superseded.

If the ability to form plausible ex-

.
pectations about the whole of society based on knowledge of
a part of it was to be maintained, general prohibitions would
be necessary.

Laws did not come forward from some grand de-

sign for society, but emerged one by one as people perceived
.
inordinate difficulties in forming correct expectations concerning that part of society they did not know first-hand.

93

The emergence of this new social order culminated,
after slow and painful growth, is what Hayek calls the Great
Society or

the Open Society.

In the Great Society, "indi-

viduals are constrained only to obey the abstract rules that
demarcate the domain of the means that each is allowed to
use for his purposes."

94

The realization of the Great

Society coincides with the complete disappearance of the

93Hayek, Constitution, pp. 149-150; and Hayek, New
Studies, pp. 10-11.
94 Hayek, Mirage, p. 144.
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belief that any collective purposes exist, the attainment of
which merits the use of the government's coercive powers.
Hayek refers to Michael Oakeshott's terminological distinction between teleocracy and nomocracy to explain the Great
Society.

The Great Society, or the nomocracy, is an abstract

order; it does not exist for anything, except the facilitation of the pursuit by individuals of their own goals.

The

teleocracy, on the other hand, "treats some goals pursued by
some people as exceptionally worthy, elevating them to the
status of the common good, .whose realization may be furthered
by using the power of the state. 95
The development from absolute teleocracy ·to the Great
Society corresponds to the change from rule by command to the
Rule of Law.

Hayek explains

tha~

the ultimate legislator can

never limit his own powers by law, because he can always
abrogate any law he has made.

The Rule of Law is therefore

"not a rule of the law, but a rule concerning what the law
ought to be, a meta-legal doctrine or political ideal." 96
It will be effective only to the extent that the Rule of Law
is embraced by the rulers and, in turn, by the society at
large.

Hayek speaks of the system formed by the meta-legal
95Hayek, New Studies, p. 89.
96Hayek, Constitution, p. 206.
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doctrine as follows:
Every rule of this kind will in intention be perpetual,
though subject to revision in light of better insight
. into its interaction with other rules; and it will be
valid only as a system.of mutually modifying rules.
These rules will achieve their intended effect of securing the formation of an abstract order of actions only
through their universal application, while their application in the particular instance cannot be said to
have a specific purpose distinct from the purpose of
the system of rules as a whole.97
Within such a system we may expect that particular laws will
be "general rules of individual conduct, applicable to all
alike in an unknown number of future instances, defining the
protected domain of individuals, and therefore essentially of
the nature of prohibitions rather than of specif"ic commands." 98
The concept of Rule of Law is so important to Hayek's
thought that it requires examinat:ion in some detail.

The

first feature of the Rule that Hayek elaborates is "isonomy,"
the doctrine that every law should be equally applicable to
each member of society.

It is

ancient Greek political thought.

an ideal that originated in
As Hayek employs it, iso-

nomy is a procedureal guarantee of justice, valuable because
a substantive rule of justice cannot be found.

While we can-

not tell lawmakers what qualities just laws must have, if we
97Hayek, Rules and Order, p. 122.
98Hayek, New Studies, p. 135.
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insist that they themselves be subject to all the laws they
enact, we can be assured that the laws will not be onerous.
A government of laws, not men, is to be attained by preventing any group of governors from placing themselves above the
law. 99
Even greater generality of the law is obtained by
making each law applicable to all future instances, as well
as to all those in the society at the time it is enacted.
''The lawmaker [must] prove his belief in the justice of his
pronouncements by committing himself to their universal application to an unknown number of future instances and renouncing the power of modifying their application to particular
cases." 100 According to Hayek, freedom is enhanced when the
law is concerned with general matters and the legislators
are incapable of knowing how their actions will affect particular people.

As the effects of legislation on particular

people become a matter of legislative concern, the ability
. to make fair decisions is strained.

Law becomes more and

more a matter of helping or hurting particular persons, and
its acceptance as a
erodes. 101
99

legit~ate

regulator of human affairs

Hayek, Constitution, pp. 154-156, 164-165.

100Hayek, New Studies, p. 99.
101Hayek, Road to Serfdom, pp. 76-79.
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In addition to being general, law must be negative.
Justice consists of general prohibitions on the sort of
·means that any citizen JI18.Y employ to achieve his goals.

It

does not entail positive commands telling us what ends to
pursue. 102 Liberty is similarly negative. We should strive
for a condition in which "all is permitted that is not prohibited by general rules," rather than one where "all is pro103
hibited that is not explicitly permitted."
Hayek feels that in modern society the negative view
of law is the road not taken.

Most laws at present do not

take the forms of prohibitions to the citizenry, but instruction from the legislature to the civil servants, explaining
. what goals are to be pursued and how.

In Hayek's view, the

chief threat to liberty in our age is the growth of administrative discretion over citizens and their property.

The

government too often equates policy with law, legalizing any
efforts to accomplish its chosen purposes, even if the resulting government.actions are unequal, biased, and erratic. 104
We must distinguish that nurturing by the government of the
102Hayek, Studies, p. 167.
103Hayek, Constitution, p. 19.
104 Ibi.d., pp. 207-219.
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spontaneous order, which facilitates individuals' efforts
to act upon their particular body of knowledge, from government interference in the spontaneous order.

Hayek says the

"distinction between oiling a mechanism and rebuilding it is
.
105
comparable.
The third feature of Hayek's theory of law is the
guarantee to each citizen of a protected sphere of activity.
Hayek places himself in the long tradition of classical
liberalism calling for the maximum extension of the protected
sphere consistent with equally large spheres for all citizens.
Each citizen should be guaranteed his life, liberty, and property, and assured that claims resulting from valid contracts will be recoverable.

106

Since no security exists in

a "war of all against all," the government must have a monopoly of legal physical force to secure the private spheres
of the citizens.

But the government's power cannot legiti-

mately extend to violations of the realm of private action
it exists to defend.

Government restrictions on actions

that do not affect others, such as religious practices, are
utijustified.

107

105Hayek, Mirage, p. 129.
106 nayek, Studies, p. 167.
l07.H aye k , Const1tu
· t•1on, pp. 20 - 21 ; an d Haye k , Rul es
· and Order, p. 101, and note 10, p. 170.
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"The essence of a free society," says Hayek, "is
that the private individual is not one of th~' resources
which government admiil._isters, and that a free person can
.count on using a known domain of personal resources on the
108
basis of his knowledge and for his purposes."
The belief
that the tendency of modern life is to treat-the individual
exactly as a resource at the government's disposal is the
theme of Hayek's first and most famous political work,
The Road to Serfdom, written in 1944.

Its thesis is that

economic planning is the first step on the road to serfdom,
to a totalitarian society.

Written at a time when Hitler

was threatening free societies, and economic planning, the
determination of certain allocative and productivities by
government, was advocated by som~ as the appropriate program
for the post-War era, the book was extremely controversial.
Hayek argued that it was almost impossible to introduce a
limited amount of planning into a free economy.

If the

government tries to confine itself to certain basic decisions
it will find that some of the consequences vitiate its goals
or are otherwise unacceptable,
requiring further and more
.
.
.
109
d eta1"1 e d government p 1 ann1ng.
108uayek, New Studies, p. 99.
109Hayek, Road to Serfdom, p. 105.
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Part of the danger of the planning lies in the characters of theose who are drawn to the government of a planned
economy.

Hayek feels that planning appeals to all single-·

minded enthusiasts for a particular scheme or project.

Their

certainity about the desirability of their pet project makes
them enthusiasts for a system where goverpment power and
funds might be available to promote it.

The fact that a

planned economy cannot further more than a handful of these
schemes does not discourage such people; on the contrary,
it spurs them on to more intense intra-governmental skirmishing over budgets and authority. 110 At the broader level
of mass support, the planned economy is popular because it
feeds on the resentment of successful men and failure of the
market to achieve certain ideals.

"It is easier for people

to agree on a negative program • • • than on any positive
task."lll

As long as the planners can promote their system

as something other than capitalism, they will be assured of
popular support.
A further difficulty with planning is that it is incompatible with the Rule of Law.

The attainment of pre-

selected goals of economic production or distribution
110

Ib~d., pp. 52-55.

111 Ibid., pp. 138-139.
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requires governments to vary their demands on the citizenry
from time to time and person to person.

Uniform laws applied

to an indefinite number of contingencies will leave too much
discretion to the people--any number of economic facts might
emerge, many of them very different from those the government desires.

Steering the economy back towards the selec-

ted results will require unremitting efforts by the government; and, because a legislature lacks the expertise or
institutional

capacity to superintend a modern economy, the

planning and supervision of economic activity is delegated
to bureaucracies empowered with vast discretionary authority.
The government must have this authority if it is to plan,
and if it has such authority the legal environment may
change so rapidly that individuals cannot make or pursue
. own p 1 ans. 112
th eJ.r
So the government may become increasingly petty,
erratic, and burdensome.

Is the necessary culmination of

this development vicious totalitarianism?

Some of Hayek's

critics have argued that Serfdom's thesis is guilty of
simple determinism.

Cultrual and political factors have

too great an effect on the course of a nation's history to
112

Ibid., pp. 61-71.
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attribute every modern dictatorship to planning. 113

Hayek

insists that planning does indeed engender totalitarianism,
but that this cu-lmination may require generations.

The

principle consequence of planning is that the people's
attachment to freedom is slowly lost by attrition.

The

government's activism produces a psychological change in
the people that makes further government encroachment
acceptable, and the ultimate attainment of total government
114
power unremarkabl·e.
Planning was nowhere embraced to the extent its sup115
porters, such as Wassily Leontief, had hoped.
What we
have instead, says Hayek, is "interventionist chaos," as
removed from pure capitalism as it is from central planning.116

The vague aspiration that guides this chaos is that

we can have the spontaneous order and remake it too.

It is

in just such a polity that government intervention is likely
117
to increase without limit.
113 see, for example, Barbara Wooton, Freedom Under
Planning, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1945), pp. 28-29.
114 Hayek, Studies, p. 224.
115Hayek, New Studies, pp. 232-242.
116Hayek, Individualism, p. 136.
ll 7 Haye k , M"1rage, pp. 142 - 143
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Hayek sometimes seems to regard democracy as the
spontaneous order's worst friend.

118

Perhaps a benevolent

dictator, fully appreciative of the market's capacities,
would do the best job nurturing the spontaneous order.

But

Hayek is aware of the dangers of this arrangement, and remains a democrat, albeit a concerned and unetbusiastic one.
He does accept democracy as a mechanism for the resolution
of conflict without resorting to violence, and he retains
some hope,

despit~

his observations of democracy's flaws,

that the experience of self-government might promote a certain caution and prudence in the citizens' approach to pub.
119
11·c a ff a1rs.
We have noted that Hayek values liberty only because
it is conducive to progress.

Similarly, Hayek supports

democracy only to the extent that it promotes freedom.

The

governing majority is capable, he feels, of measures inimical to liberty.

In the short-run they may be a threat only

to those outside the majority.

But over time a democracy can

extinguish liberty throughout a whole society.

If democrats

arrogate to themselves the power to shape every aspect of
social life, innovation will disappear.

A society that

119
Hayek, Constitution, pp. 107-109.
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changes only as the majority approves will stagnate, and in
such a society liberty is superfluous and will be regarded
as sue·h·• 120
Hayek insists on distinguishing support for liberty
from support for democracy.

The opposite of a free society

is, he says, totalitarianism, where every aspect of life is
subject to government superintendence, and where people have
"rights" only to the extent that government neglects to
regulate some actions.

The opposite of democracy is authori-

tarianism, in which the people have no voice in determining
who governs and how.

However strong the support liberty and

democracy give to each other, it is important to understand
that their coincidence is not inevitable.

A democracy could

degenerate into a totalitarian society, and, to the extent
that such an occurrence is likely, the liberty of the people
. ht b e 1 ess vu 1 nerabl e un d er an au th or1•t ar1an
.
.
t • 121
m1g
governmen
Even the word "democracy" worries Hayek; he would prefer his
neologism, "demarchy, '' to stress the people's rule rather
than their power.

The rule of the people is more consistent

with the insistence that_they obey certain cannons of justfce
120 Ibid.-, pp. 103-107, and 109-115.
121

Hayek, Studies, p. 161.
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than is the stressing, or glorifying, of the raw power they
122
possess.
The fear that

~~mocracy

has become an ever greater

.menace to liberty assumes a prominent place in Hayek's recent
work·.

He is especially concerned that the separation of

powers has proven inadequate for the prevention of the rise
of unlimited democracy.
the

existen~e

Whatever security is provided by

of separate judicial and executive branches is

more than erased by the possession by the legislature of two
quite different powers, the writing of laws and the making
of government policy.

The same governmental body charged

with formulating rules of just conduct applicable to all persons for the indefinite future is also empowered to direct
the government's resources towards the realization of policy
goals of its own choice.

The problem, as Hayek sees it, is

that when the perservation of established laws conflicts
with the attainment of policy goals, the former is routinely
123
sacrificed to the latter.
This may be done by constant
legislative action, or it may come about as a result of the
legislature delegating the discretionary authority to pursue
policy goals to a bureaucracy, a process American political
122Hayek, New Studies, pp. 93-94.

123 Ibid., pp. 98-101.

62
scientist

Theodore Lowi describes as "policy without

1 aw. 11124
As a measure of_his concern, perhaps his desperation,
.about the erosion of the protected sphere formed by known
and certain laws, Hayek has argued that the institutions of
modern democracies need to be altered to provide further
separation of powers.
legislative body.

Hayek proposes the creation of a new

The presently constituted legislatures

would continue making policy and directing the government's
re:sources.

The new legislature would assume the powers for

writing laws that actually inform the citizen what he may
.
not legally do. Though popularly elected, this legislature
would be relatively immune to democratic pressures to alter
the law, because legislators

:

wou~d

.

serve for fifteen years

' 125

and be ineligible for re-elect1on.

The judiciary would

resolve disputes over the jurisdictional boundary between
the law and policy legislature, as well as deciding whether
a proposed policy contravenes the law.

126

Hayek does not

expect that his plan will ever be put into action, but he
124

Theodore 'J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The
Second Republic of the United States, 2nd ed. (New York:
W.W. Norton & Company), pp. 92-125~
125Hayek, New Studies, pp. 102-104

126Hayek Political Order, pp. 120-121.
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feels that it serves as a way to illuminate the need for
distinguishing policy-making from law-making.

127

Hayek's desire for greater separation of powers has
more behind it than the desire that form should follow function in government.

Something needs to be done to compen-

sate for the type of pressures brought to bear on modern
governments.

The disease of democracy is the interest-

group domination of representative assemblies; the policies
that emerge are inevitably bundles of favors for different
groups.

Because the modern legislature possesses so much

power there is no demand that it is not expected to satisfy.
Concern about writing good and equitable laws plays no part
as coalitions are stapled together.

128

Hayek says there is

no constituency lobbying for the ~ule of Law:
The almost exclusive concern of the representatives
with government rather than legislation is a consequence of the fact that they know that their re-election depends chiefly on the record of their party in
government and not on legislation.
It is the voters'
satisfaction with the immediate effects of governmental measures, not their judgment of the effect of
alterations in the law, noticeable only in ~ge long
run, which they will express at the polls.l
127Hayek, New Stud.ies, p. 118.
128 Hayek, Political Order, pp. 1-19.
129

Ibid., p. 29.
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The present unification of policy-making and lawmaking results in both tasks being done poorly, says Hayek.
Policies that could be-directed towards prudently selected
.·long-range goals are instead Balkanized into a list of
cessions to interests.

con~

The only internal logic of such

policies is that they placate factions that could terminate
political careers.

The law-making is inadequate because the

entire process has become subordinate to mollifying groups
through policy.

When confronted with an issue like abor-

tion or capital punishment, where concessions and gestures
to an array of interest groups is not possible, modern
legislators are helpless.

Such issues require them to

articulate and act upon a public philosophy, and these are

130
s k 1rll s th ey h ave 1 os t f rom d"1suse.
Hayek believes that his proposal, which we might call
functional bicameralism, would provide a buffer between the
lawmaking assembly and the-political pressures of organized
interest groups.

The law makers would have long terms of

office and no concerns about re-election, enabling them to
resist any outside

press~res

as fairly as they can.

to do anything but write laws -

Even the policy-making legislature

Will be rescued from excessive lobbying, because the Rule

130

.

Ibid.,_pp. 30-31.
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of Law will circumscribe the policy-making process; efforts
to pressure the policy legislature or the bureaucracy to
ignore the law will

As an additional measure

b~_pointless.

for protecting the government from interest-group pressures,
Hayek would disenfrancise those who work for the government
.
131
and those who receive government assistance. A final quality of the Rule of Law remains to be considered.

We have noted that Hayek feels that true laws

should be universal, in the sense of applying to every member of society and to an indefinite number of future contingencies, negative, and should describe a protected domain
of activity for every citizen.

Theoretically, a society

could arrive at a body of law that possessed these qualities.
If it did so, would any change be necessary?

Would there

be anything left for Hayek's law-making legislature, or any
existing legislature, to do?

According to Hayek, a law con'

sonant with the Rule of Law is "subject to revision in the
light of better insight into its interaction with other
rules. 11132 This better insight may be the result of new
intellectual apprehension, but it is more likely that the
changing course of human activity in the spontaneous _order
131 Ibid., pp. 115, 120.
132Hayek, Rules and Order, p. 122.
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will create unanticipated conflicts between lawful actions.
In the resolution of these conflicts new laws are created,
and these new laws

be extensions of the Rule of Law
133
.to new human endeavors or problems.
sho~ld

The capacity of the Rule of Law to grow incrementally
to meet new contingencies is explained by the reciprocal
relationship between law and a civilization's ideas of
justice.

The law shapes and is shaped by a civilization's.

ideas about what the law ought to be.

Hayek writes:

It is not only in his knowledge, but also in his aims
and values, that man is the creature of civilization;
in the last resort, it is the relevance of these individual wishes to the perpetuation of the group or
the species that will determine whether they will
persist or change. It is, of course, a mistake to
believe that we can draw conclusions about what our
values ought to be simply because we realize that
they are a product of evolution. But we cannot
reasonably doubt that these values are created and
altered by the same evolutionary forces that have produced our intelligence. All that we can know is the
ultimate decision about what is good or bad will be
made not by individual human wisdom but by the decli~~
of groups that have adhered to the "wrong" beliefs.l
Is it

~ot

an intolerable burden on the legislator that

his decisions should affect not only the citizens of a
society, but will determine the life or death of his entiresociety?

Hayek says that legislators do not need to assume

the burden of protecting their entire way of life, because
133Hayek, Studies, p. 168.
134Hayek, Constitution, p. 36.
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the fate of a civilization depends on qualities that legislators or laws can affect but not alter.

Laws do not have a

purpose, even the preservation of a society; laws can only
facilitate the various goals pursued by the members of a
society.

Laws do not exist to fashion a particular order

but to nurture the spontaneous order, to guarantee that
abstract order, or quality of orderliness, that makes the
emergence of a concrete order with particular characteristics
possible.

To attempt more is beyond the legislator's capa-

cities:
The "social goal" or "common purpose," for which
society is to be organized is usually vaguely described as the "common good," the "general welfare,"
or the "general interest." It does not need much
reflection to see that these terms have no sufficiently definite meaning to determine a particular
course of action. The wel·fare and the happiness of
millions c~gnot be measured on a single scale of less
and more.l
The hubris that leads some to suppose that the law
can be a device for organizing an entire society in a desired
way can be traced back to constructive rationalism.

The

source of constructive rationalism is Cartesian dualism, the
belief that mind can stand outside nature, enabling man to
"design the institutions of society and culture among which
.
136
he lives."
The fact that Descrates praised Sparta because
135Hayek, Road to Serfdom, p. 57.
· Rules and Order, pp. 112-115.
136Hayek, Rules and Order, p. 17.

See also Hayek,
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its laws, "originated by a single individual,.

• all

tended to a single end," is characteristic of the belief
that the deliberately,constructed is "necessarily superio:r;
'to all mere growth." 137 The fact of the matter, Hayek insists, is that the human mind "is as much the product of
-

the social environment" as it is a force that has "acted
upon and altered social institutions." 138 What Cartesians
suppose is the rational determination of social goals is
rather the working out of the unique logic of a particular
social order.
So, there is no common good, and even if there were,
people could not sufficiently transcend their time and place
to perceive it.

Good govern·ance then consists of applying

our opinions, reflecting the ideals of our society, to the
Rule of Law, rather than relying on human will to ascertain
objects for thE, government to pursue.

We should approach

an extant body of laws as executors of an estate rather than
authors of a w,ill.

As good executors we will try to carry

out the expressed wishes of a written will to the best of
our ability, even if it requires us to execute decisions
we would not ourselves have made.

If the circumstances we

137Hayek, New Studies, p. 255. The passage by Descartes is ta~en from the Discourse on Method, part II.
138Hayek, Rules and Order, p. 17.
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confront were not anticipated by the will's author then we
must seek to resolve the issue in the way most consistent
with the will's provisions; we cannot impose any solution
that we happen to like.

The Rule of Law requires us to

approach the task of governance with the same respect for
precedent, the same reluctance to strike out for new destinations.

According to Hayek:

The larger the groups within which we hope to live
in peace, the more the common values which are
enforced must be confined to abstract and general
rules of conduct. The members of an Open Society
have and can have in common only g~inions on values
but not a will on concrete ends.l
Hayek has located his own understanding of society
somewhere between the ancient alternatives of nature and
convention (see above pp. 29-30). Similarly, his legal philosophy lies somewhere between legal positivism and natural
law.

His critique of the former is uncompromising.

Hayek

sees legal positivism as the greatest threat to the Rule of
Law.

By holding.that lawfulness is a merely factual quality,

requiring only the appropriate procedures by the appropriate
agencies, legal positivism supports the view that any law, no matter how flagrantly it violates the sphere of ~ersonal
. f u 11 y 1 eg1•t•1mat e. 140 Legal positivism thus
l ~.b erty, 1s
139Hayek, New Studies, p. 88.
140Hayek, Constitution, pp. 236-239.
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stands as an invitation to use the law for any purposes the
legislator desires; Hayek regards it as a modern expression
.
o f cons t rue t lVe
ra t.lena1'lsm. 141
In rejecting legal positivism Hayek does not embrace
natural law.

He regards the common law tradition as an

alternative attributable to human action but not to human,
or natural, design.

He explains his position this way:

If we do not insist that the test of justice must
enable us to build up a whole system of new rules of
just conduct, but are content persistently to apply
the negative test of injustice to the parts of an
inherited system, the greater part of whose rules
are universally accepted, we may accept the contention of positivism that there are no positive criteria of justice; yet we can still maintain that the
further development of the rules of just conduct is
not a matter of arbitrary will but of inner necessity, and that solutions to open problems of justice
are discovered, not .arbitrarily decreed.l42
By the "negative test.of injustice" Hayek refers to the common law process of modifying the law by discarding new laws
or new applications of old laws that are unjust by virtue of
the "inner necess::j_ty" of the whole legal order.
We will postpone until later (Chapter Five) a discussian of how successful Hayek has been in navigating a
.

.

betwt>.en legal positivism and natural law.
141Hayek, Studies, pp. 101-104.
142Hayek, Mirage, P· 44.

cours~

For the present it
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would be useful to see how Hayek applies his theory of law
to a controversy impinging on the distribution of income.
We will select Hayek's choice of the issue "on which the
whole character of future society will depend"--progressive
taxation. 143 The question of progressive taxation is not
identical with that of income redistribution.-

A measure of

progressivity in income tax rates may be instituted only
to offset the regressive effects of measures like the sales
tax.

Similarly, income could be redistributed without re-

sorting to a progressive tax.

If a proportional income tax

were high enough it could generate revenues to provide for
government services to the poor, a type of redistribution.
But in the main, progressive taxation is the chief means of
effecting income redistribution in modern societies. 144
The history of progressivity is, in Hayek's eyes, the
triumph of will over opinion.

In the early nineteenth cen-

tury progressivity was explicitly argued as a device for
bringing about the redistribution of income, as well as for
advancing other socialist goals.

It was rejected at the

time p·recisely because the goals of the Left were rejected,
says Hayek.

Around the turn of the century, a new case for

progressivity was made in terms of ability to pay, or
143 Hayek, Constitution, p. 306.
144 ibid., pp. 307-308.
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equality of sacrifice.

The discipline of political economy

was being transformed by utility theory at the time.

Its

leading English exponent was Alfred Marshall, while the
chief Continental economists were Carl Menger and Eugene
Bohm-Bawerk, two Austrians who established a tradition of
economic thought in Austria of which Hayek is the best
twentieth-century representative.

Utility theory holds that

consumption decisions can be explained in terms of the
diminishing satisfaction provided by the consumption of an
additional unit of any good.

It was at first thought that

the theory could be the basis for interpersonal comparisons.
It was the application of this form of the utility theory
that led some to believe we could determine scientifically
I

how much a person with a $50,000'income would have to pay in
taxes before he had sacrificed as much as a person with a
$25,000 income paying a given level of taxes.

Later re-

finements of utility theory discarded the idea of utility
as an objective quality inhering in money or other economic
goods.

Utility is now understood as a subjective quality,

which removes the "scientific" justification from the
equ~.lity-of-sacrifice

argument--economists no longer purport

73

to know at what point different tax rates will inflict equal
. t ress. 145
d 1s

If equality of sacrifice was no longer academically
respectable it was quite popular by the early twentieth century.

Those who objected to progressive taxes because they

wanted to preserve equality before the law
equal sacrifice was the only goal in view-.

we~e

assured that

Those who claimed

that progressivity opened the door to legislative caprice
and arbitrariness_were charged with "betraying a reprehensible lack of confidence in the wisdom of democratic governmen t • "146

As Hayek sees it, this lack of confidence was soon

fully justified; rates went from mildly to steeply progressive within a few years after the acceptance of the principle
of progression.

The argument for progression has come full

circle, it is now defended in terms of redistribution once
again.
Part of Hayek's brief against the progressive income
tax is that of an economist.

He says that progressivity

causes only a very small net increase in the government's in.

.

come, so it is not necessary for preserving government social
145

Ibid., pp. 308-309.

See also, Everett J. Burtt,

Jr.; Social Perspectives in the History of Economic Thought
(New York:

St. Martin's Press, 1972), pp. 173-200.

146 Hayek, Constitution, p. 310.
147

Ibid., pp. 310-311.
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prcgrams.

Nor are the poor the main beneficiaries of a

progressive tax.

The more numerous working class winds up

with the lightest tax burden.

148

Progressivity does pose

· a great barrier to the creation of wealth.

For example,

people who will tolerate lean years waiting for a project
to become profitable are punished if it does-so suddenly,
pushing them into high tax brackets.

Indeed, the progres-

sive tax places a lighter burden on the rich than it does
on those who are trying to become rich, because it is new
ventures that are especially dependent on sudden freshets
of income.

By burdening these enterprises, progressive

taxes protect old money and established businesses.

149

But the really threatening aspect of progressive
taxation, in Hayek's eyes, is its departure from the Rule
of Law.

It is by definition contrary to isonomy, since a

progressive tax is really a series of different tax laws
for different gi-oups.

The protection that isonomy affords

the private domain of citizens is eliminated; freed from
the worry of making their laws universal, legislators may
treat the tax code as a confiscatory device.

Once the

principle of progressivity is accepted there is no limit
148

Ibid., pp. 311-313.

1 9
~ Ibid., pp. 315-321.
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to which it may be imposed. 150

Democracies in particular

are prone to carry progression to extremes, because it
invites the majority to make the minority pay for government
·programs.

As Hayek says:

Democracy has yet to learn that, in order to be just
it must be guided in its action by general principles • • • • Where, as in the case of progression,
the so-called principle adopted is no more than an
open invitation to discrimination and, what is worse,
an invitation to the majority to discriminate against
a minority, the pretended principle of justice becomes the pretext for pure arbitrariness.l51
We can extend Hayek's argument against progressive
taxation, the best-established redistributive device, to the
redistributive process generally.

We have already seen that

Hayek prizes the spontaneous order as the surest path to
prosperity.

Efforts to circumvent that order to see that

people get what the government thinks they need or deserve
have the effect of diminishing the chances that poor people
have for attaining self sufficiency.

The study of Hayek's

theory of law establishes the additional point that there is
a strong tendency for government alteration of the spontaneous order to feed on itself.

The logic of the redistri-

butive process is to render inevitable measures once considered Wlthinkable.

Departures from the Rule of Law not

only impede progress, but they establish momentum towards

l5

? Ibid.,

pp. 313-315.

151 Ibid., p. 314.
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centrally directing every aspect of social life that is all
but irresistable.

Not only does the steadily worsening

economy elicit calls for more government measures to protect
.the citizenry (from the consequences of established government measures), but the steady growth of government makes
each new addition to its responsibilities less objectionable.
The Hayekian response to the egalitarian critique of
capitalism may be summarized as follows:

1) The question is

not whether capitalism, and its concomitant distribution of
income, is the best system imaginable, but whether it is the
best available.

It is beside the point, therefore, to dwell

on the moral shortcomings of capitalism unless one can propose a feasible alternative that satisfies our moral concerns.
2) A feasible alternative to capitalism will find some way to
continue capitalism's generation of wealth; otherwise, the
amount of wealth to be distributed will be less than required to give everyone what they need or deserve.

Hayek

doubts that such an alternative is available, because of the
essential roles that the division of knowledge and reward
according to market value_play in producing wealth.
.

3) A
.

feasible alternative to capitalism will find some internal
controls on its political program to.keep the redistribution
of wealth according to need or desert from degenerating into
the satisfaction of envy or the placating of the most
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numerous or powerful groups in society.

Hayek doubts that

any redistribution of income can proceed within the framework of the Rule of Law, and that any system eschewing

th~

Rule of Law can find an alternative that does not subject
the citizen to arbitrary, erratic, and intrusive rules of
conduct.
Hayek's argument is compelling to the extent that his
insistence on examining real alternatives and on the improbability of making limited changes in capitalism is compelling.

Hayek's demand that we confine ourselves to real

possibilities cannot be faulted.

His argument that the

spontaneous order nurtured by the Rule of Law is indivisible
is more questionable.

The first suggestion that the spon-

taneous order might be capable of sustaining revision comes
from Hayek's own writings on what the government of a
modern society may justifiably do.

CHAPTER FOUR

WHAT GOVERNMENT MAY DO

Let us suppose that everything Hayek claims for the
spontaneous order is true.

The free market is vastly more

productive than any other arrangement.

The poor are afforded

a greater opprotunity to escape from poverty under capitalism
than in any alternative system.

The progress of the spon-

taneous order will regularly cause unemployment in sectors
of the economy; people selling skills that have become
obsolete, such as carriage makers, will be unemployed.

But

the new demands and productive techniques that supplanted
the carriage industry will create new opportunities in other
sectors, such as automobile manufacturing.

It is not neces-

sary that unemployed carriage makers have comprehensive
knowledge of the structural changes in the economy.

The

operation of the price system will make information about
new job opportunities easily accessible.
Even if all this is true, are we fully prepared to
accept all the consequences of the market's distribution of
income?

Is Hayek?

He has described the market distrjbution

of income as a mixed game of skill and luck,- the playing of
which increases everyone's chances of attaining economic
success •. But no matter how large the jackpot, some players
78
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are going to be without skills, and others without luck.
The severely handicapped and the people unable to find work
despite their best efforts will lose this game of skill and
.chance.
thei~

More successful players may decide to give some of

winnings to the least fortunate--altruism being com-

patible with individualism--but whether their gifts are
sufficient to rescue the poor from abject misery is also,
from the perspective of the poor, a matter of luck.

If, as

Hayek says, "the only way in which we can effectively improve
[the spontaneous order] is by improving the abstract rules
which guide the individuals," then the spontaneous order
seems incapable of being altered in ways beneficial to the
poor. 152
By taking such a position, Hayek seems to place himself. in the ranks of the advocates of laissez-faire.

To

"allow to act" is precisely the posture one should take, presumably, towards a society capable of spontaneously ordering
itself in the way.most congenial to its citizens.

Herman

Finer's attack on The Road to Serfdom, titled Road to
'Reaction, was one of the earliest and most vitriolic attacks
on Hayek for being just the sort of social philosopher who
would accept the misery of the poor rather than government
152Hayek, Studies, p. 92. (Italics mine.)
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intervention in the market. 153
And yet, almost at the outset of The Road to Serfdom,
Hayek insists that he-is not an advocate of laissez-faire.
·He argues that the market economy has been unfortunate in
having so many proponents who, unlike Hayek, understand it
wholly in terms of rigid fealty to laissez-faire.

The cri-

tics of capitalism, he says, have been immeasurably assisted
by the existence of this strident, uncompromising argument.
They do not have ·to construct a caricature of the case for
the market, and are free to ignore more subtle and cautious
arguments, such as Hayek's. 154
This chapter will examine the degree to which Hayek's
political thought differs from the advocacy of a "minimal
state."

The usual definition of laissez-faire is that it

is a political system where the government confines itself
to the prevention of force or fraud. 155 Hayek believes that
the defenders of the market economy must consider two other
areas of governemnt action if the market is to be preserved.
153
Herman Finer, Road to Reaction (Boston:
Brown, 1945).

Little,~-

154 Hayek, Road to Ser f dom, pp. 17-19.
155Hayek, Constitution, pp. 222-224. See also John
Arthur and William H. ShE"w, Justice and Economic Distribu~ (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1978), p. 54.
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First, they must prescribe a stable monetary framework that
does not leave monetary policy at the mercy of discretionary
changes aimed at othez:_policy goals.

Second, they must find

.a policy that will protect the poor and unemployable while
interfering as little as possible with progress under the
market. 156
Hayek has grown more concerned and more pessimistic
in recent years about monetary policy, specifically about
the prospects for-avoiding inflation.

So deep are his feel-

ings here that Hayek is driven to quote John Maynard Keynes
approvingly, albeit from Keynes' early writing:
There is no subtler, no surer means of overturning
the existing basis of society than to debauch the
currency. The process engages all the hidden forces
of economic law on the side of destruction, and does
it in a manner whicg not one man in a million is able
to diagnose, • • • 1 7
Unlike other social evils, inflation is not immediately recognized as being harmful--for many years, people may misinterpret inflation as growing prosperity.

Even after the

illusory nature of this "prosperity" becomes evident, the
trademill logic of inflation generally directs popular
opinion and the government towards trying to get ahead
156 Hayek, Individualism, p. 112.

157Hay.ek, New Studies, p. 200, citing John Maynard
Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919), reP~inted in The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes
(Macmillan for the Royal Economic Society, 1971), vol. II,
p. 149.
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of inflation, which is to say, accelerating inflation. 158
Hayek does offer a solution to the problem of inflation, although it is like his restructuring of democracy,
'heuristic rather than

pblit~cally

plausible.

Hayek's pro-

posal is that governments legalize the internal use of
foreign currency.

As matters stand, each nation's treasury

faces a captive market, and therefore lacks any incentive to
protect the value of its "product."

But if Americans, say,

could transact business with one another in francs and
pounds as well as dollars, there would be a powerful incentive for the American Federal Reserve System to preserve
the value of the dollar--that is, to stop inflation.

The

alternative is the same that faces any other enterprise
producing an uncompet.i ti ve product--dissolution.

According

to Hayek, if international borders become irrelevant to
monetary systems, Gresham's Law will be reversed.

No longer

will bad money drive out the good, as is the case if and
only if the bad money is tied to the good at a fixed rate
of exchange.

With various currencies free to change value

vis-a-vis one another, well-regulated currencies will drive
.
.d 1n
. d"1scr1m1na
. .
t e 1 y. 159
ou . t h e ones 1ssue
t

158Hayek, Studies, pp. 296-297.
15

~Hayek, New Studies, pp. 225-227.
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A more durable source of controversy is the extent
to which pure capitalism should be supplemented by government aid to the poor. __ Unlike standardizing weights and
.measures or protecting the value of the currency, providing
for the poor necessarily entails departures from the spontaneous order.

We are no longer merely facilitating economic

exchanges among citizens, but using the power of the government to see that particular economic results are attained.
Based on Hayek's elaborate case for the spontaneous
order, we would expect that he would be extremely reluctant
to accept any government involvement in the allocation of
wealth.

Yet he expresses his skepticism about the preser-

va tion of :gure capital ism:

"The term 'laissez fa ire' is a

highly ambiguous and misleading description of the principles
16
on which a [pro-market] policy is based."
For the govern-

°

ment provision of certain services Hayek displays a remarkable enthusiasm.

He finds the case for using the govern-

ment's power of taxation to fund services not provided by
the market "unquestionable;" there is "an overwhelming case"
for the governemnt to exe_rcise these powers; nor "can it beseriously questioned" that goods enjoyed by all should be
.
161
paid for collectively.
Indeed, Hayek seems disposed to
160Hayek, Road to Serfdom, p. 81.
161 Hayek, Political Order, pp. 41-42.
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accept every goal of the modern welfare state--aid to the
poor and disabled, social insurance, education, and subsidizing certain developments.

Only because he has serious

·objection to the method by which these goals have been pursued in the past, can we refrain from labeling Hayek a

. 1 d emocra t • 162
soc1a
What is the basis for Hayek's support for the goals
of the welfare state, and how does he reconcile such pursuits to the spontaneous order?.

We may begin by noting that

there is no overriding imperative leading Hayek to accept
government programs for the poor comparable to the concern
for progress that underlays his whole case for the free
market.

Hayek promotes various welfare state measures for

a variety of causes, according to the spontaneous order's
inability to guarantee a needed measure of equity or
security.

One reason Hayek offers for favoring programs

for the relief of poverty is that it is a way that the rest
of society can protect itself from violent actions by
desparate people.
ment.

163

After extensive

This is not a morally attractive argul~oting

in New York City in 1977,

U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young suggested that the looting was

162uayek, Constitution, pp. 257-258.
163 Ibid~, pp. 285, 286.
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justified by the poverty of the people who engaged in it. 164
If this view is correct, then Hayek's argument must be
altered to say that wawill assuage poverty not to prevent
·violence but to prevent jUStified violence.

Social relief

becomes a moral rather than a practical necessity.

If the

poor are not justified in using force to relieve their
poverty, then the government "program" called for should be
the prevention of force by arresting citizens who violate
others' property ·rights.

Hayek does not express an opinion

on the justice of looting by the poor, and his silence on
this question, along with what he does say about the need
to help the poor, leaves the impression that he embraces a
brutally pragmatic view of the relation between the poor and
the self-sufficient:

Those who are not poor have no obli-

gation to help those who are, but are advised to do so for
their own safety.

As a practical matter, they should seek

to spend the minimum amount necessary, whether in police
protection or .social relief, to pacify the poor.

The poor

have no right to a minimum standard of living, but possess
the capacity to

intimida~e

the rest of society.

As a prac-

tical matter, they should use it to increase the liklihood
of receiving the most generous welfare payments possible,
and reduce the chances of police restriction.

If this is

164aeorge F. Will, The Pursuit of Happiness and Other
Sobering Thoughts (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 212.
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the true meaning of this particular tenet of Hayek's
porting welfare measures, it is deplorable.
the true meaning,

Raye~

sup-

If it is not

needs to elaborate this argument

.to prevent grave misinterpretations.
Hayek offers a second reason why government should
not be confined to laissez-faire.

Some economic goods and

costs have neighborhood effects on people not party to any
transactions.

If the owner of the vacant lot across the

street from myhouse decides to sell his property to someone
who will turn it into an auto junkyard, then I have suffered
a cost, in the enjoyment of my house, in my ability to sell
it, and in the price I will receive if I do sell it.

Hayek

regards a spillover effect of this nature as a sufficient
reason for government intervention.

He would have, in this

instance, a town planning commission assess the junkyard
owner a surtax to reflect the cost to the neighbors of his
enterprise, thereby causing the cost of his business to
accurately reflect all its consequences, on his customers
165
as well as on bystanders.
A related argument for giving the government more
than minimal powers is the practical necessity of relying
on the government to finance "public goods."
165Hayek, Constitution, pp. 349-353.
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of certain

goods, like city streets, cannot feasibly be

apportioned among those who use them.

Voluntary contribu-

tions for their construction and upkeep won't work either,
because while everyone might be willing to pay, no one wants
to be taken advantage of by people who will use the streets
without paying for them.

So the only practical way of get-

ting something everybody wants and is willing to pay for is
166
to have the government require payment through taxation.
To some extent, the alleviation of poverty is amenable to
the same argument; all things being equal, people would prefer to live in a society with less poverty rather than more.
Individualcontributions to the poor have a negligible
effect, but a tax-supported program to aid the poor has the
167
desired consequences.
The fourth reason Hayek gives for a relatively high
government profile is closely related to the nature of the
Open Society.

According to Hayek, we cannot really say

that the emergence of the Open Society is a good thing.
"The question whether, if we had to stop at our present
stage of development, we,would be in any significant sense
better off or happier than if we had stopped a hundred or
166 Hayek, Political Order, p. 44.
167samuel Brittan, "Hayek, the New Right, and the
Crisis of.Social Demcoracy," Encounter 54 (January 1980): 35.
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a thousand years ago is probably unanswerable." 168

The

development of the Open Society is beyond morality, a profound fact we must make the best of.

However, the transi-

tion to it is not always smooth, and the government may
need to take actions that facilitate adjustment to the new
way of life.

Because the guarantee of economic security

provided by extended families, tribes, or villa.ges, is lacking from the Open Society, government will have to compensate for the absence of some of the most basic effects of
that cohesion.

As Hayek states:

A system which aims at tempting large numbers to
leave the relative security which the membership in
the small group has given would probably-soon produce
great discontent and violent reaction when those who
have first enjoyed its benefits find themselves without help when, through no fault of their own, their
capacity to earn a living,ceases.l69
Hayek's argument for the governmen~ provision of
elementary education relies on several of these claims.

Edu-

cation is a means of transmitting cultural values as well as
knowledge.

In modern society diversity among people may be

so great that a common culture is not spontaneously transmitted.

-

To prevent slow dissolution of society, the govern-

ment may rightfully act to instill the rudiments of ·a common outlook in young people.

Education is also a public

168 Hayek, Constitution, p. 41.
169Hayek, Political Order, p. 55.
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good, in the sense that we want to live in a society where
people are literate rather than illiterate, and the only
way to guarantee universal education is through public
financing. 170
One could presumably list other areas where modern
governments are now active of which Hayek would approve.
But the basic point that Hayek favors government involvement
in a number of areas is sufficiently clear.

Hayek himself

catalogs the sort of government undertakings he favors, not
because these projects are without other advocates, but to
separate himself from those to his right, that is, from
those who insist on a smaller role for government.

Given

Hayek's audience, and his view of the political tendencies
of the age, his more important t:ask is to distance himself
from those on his left, which he does by insisting on a different view of the appropriate means for the attainment of
commonly desired ends.

The existing welfare state needlessly

circumvents the spontaneous order, Hayek feels.

Its legi-

timate goals could be accomplished without government actions
on behalf of every person and group in society.

Part of the

problem is the failure to distinguish the alleviation of
poverty from the redistribution of income for the satisfaction of egalitarian sentiments.

"The doctrine of the safety

170Hayek, Constitution, p. 377.
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net, to catch those who fall, has been made meaningless by
the doctrine of fair shares for those of us who are quite
171 H
able to Stand. rr
-~ye k cons id
·ers th e e ff or t t o prov1. d e
certain kinds of assistance to all, even to those able to
take care of themselves, in order to avoid making the poor
172
feel inferior or isolated, similarly excessive, "absurd."
Finally, a modern prosperous society can offer two types of
economic security, a minimum standard of living or the preservation of a person's accustomed standard of living.
According to Hayek, efforts that start out for the first
destination always seem to gravitate towards the second. 173
An .even worse problem than the tendency of the welfare state to overflow its banks is the stifling effect it
has on experimental forms of production and consumption that
are essential to progress.

Hayek states:

If,: _instead of administering limited. resources put
under its control for a specific service, government uses its coercive powers to insure that men are
given what some expert thinks they need; if people
thus can no longer exercise any choice.in some of
the most important matters of their lives, such as
health, employment, housing, and provision for old
age, but must accept the decisions made for them by
appointed authority on the basis of its evaluation
of. their need; if certain services become the exclusive domain of the state, and whole professions--be
it medicine, education, or insurance--come to exist
171 Ibid., p. 285.
172 Ibid., p. 303.
173 Hayek, Road to Serfdom, pp. 119-133.
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only as unitary bureaucratic hierarchies, it will
no longer be competitive experimentation but solely
the decisions of authority that will determine what
men shall get.l74
In every nation that adopted it, Hayek writes, social
sec~rity

went beyond requiring people to prepare for their

future needs and providing for the care for the very poor
to a unitary, comprehensive government system of taxation
and disbursements.

While such a system may be superior in

the short-run by virtue of economies of scale, as competing
arrangements for income security are wiped away, beneficial
innovations are destroyed.

The single system becomes in-

creasingly convoluted as it changes to meet new contingencies.

Eventually, only the top administrators of the

program can understand it at all.

One of the results is

that it can then be truly said that "every knowledgeable
expert" favors the existing program, and would like to see
175
it receive more funding.
Hayek insists that the goals of
the welfare

stat~

could have been provided for within the

framework of the Rule of Law, but this would have required
a long experimental process with a much larger role for
private arrangements than is anywhere the case today. 176
174

Hayek, Constitution, p. 261.

175

Ibid., pp. 287-291.
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Hayek, New Studies, p. 145.
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Hayek feels that there are other ways to prevent the
welfare state from unnecessarily impinging on the spontaneous order.

Hayek is

~ot

opposed to regulations to protect

the environment, health standards, worker safe·ty, or other
concerns.

But he wants them to be formulated and applied

carefully to make sure that the benefits are greater than
the costs.

177

Hayek also favors delegating service func-

tions to local government as much as possible.

By doing so

we would engender healthy competition among local governments to provide the highest level of government protection
of the quality of life for the lowest cost.
could also revive communication sentiments.

178

Federalism

The Open Society

is an abstract order, but local communities are bound
together by particular customs and habits.

If welfare

state functions were delegated to these communities, civic
concern and pride would increase. 179
While Hayek has said that political philosophers
should regard their

efforts with concern if they find their

ideas very popular, it is apparently the case that political
philosophers should also be concerned if their ideas are
universally dismissed as irrelevant anachronisms.
177Hayek, Road to Serfdom, p. 37.
178Hayek, New Studies, p. 162.
179Hayek, Political Order, pp. 146-147.
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could have carried the principle of nurturing the spontaneous order to its logical conclusion, insisting that
any government

effort~

to secure a particular economic

result was, like the progressive income tax, dangerous in
itself, and worse as a precedent for future government
policy.

Had he done so his ideas would

hav~

instantly won

the contempt of all those who regard as scandalous the coexistence in a society of vast wealth and vast poverty.
Hayek's undogmatic words on behalf of the concerns, if not
the procedures, of the welfare state do gain him a hearing
for his central concerns among some of those who might
otherwise dismiss him as a reactionary. 180
But it would appear that Hayek ought to be concerned
about even the limited degree of respectability his ideas
have attained among those who look askance at the market.
To these people, who have particular goals they want the
government to realize in society, Hayek's message seems to
be an admonition·to pursue these goals cautiously by minimizing the extent to which the government goes beyond the
Rule of Law.

In other words, while Hayek rejects teleo-

cracy in favor of nomocracy, he realizes the teleocratic
orientation of many of his contemporaries, and urges them
180LOWl.,
. End of Liberalism, p. 300.
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to try to confine themselves to nomocratic means to their
teloi.

In doing so he appears to have vitiated a central

concern of his theory, the restriction of the government's
activity.

If the Rule of Law can be adapted to certain

departures from nomocracy, it is not clear that we should
draw the line between appropriate and inappropriate government activities where Hayek does.

181

It would seem that in making peripheral concessions
to his critics, Hayek has placed his entire project in
jeaprody.

He has retreated from the bold but iconoclastic

position that the salvation of modern society lies in discarding all anthropomorphic views of social goals.

Instead,

the realization of his ideals now rests on the hope that
procedureal restraints on the spontaneous order will be
sufficient to keep teleocratic incursions on it to a minimum.

It is far from clear that the procedural requirements

of the Rule of Law are adequate to the task.

If Hayek is

quite prepared to acquiesce in the teleocratic orientation
of others, then it may be that they could be clever enough
to gain all their goals while following Hayek's guidelines·

181navid Micklejohn, review of vols. 1 and 2 of
Law Legislation, and Liberty, in Ethics 88 (January 1978):
l81.
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on how to write laws.

182

This state of affairs would be a

hollow victory for the s-pontaneous order.
it seems highly

improb~ble

More threateningly,

that Hayek's procedureal stric-

tures are going to be embraced or preserved by men who do
not share his view of society's capacity to order itself
spontaneously.

If Hayek fails to win assent

~n

this larger

substantive point, the effort to secure the Rule of Law is
reduced to the status of a wish.
182

J.W.N. Watkins, "Philosophy," in Agenda for a Free
Society: Essays on Hayek's "The Constitution of Liberty" ed.
Arthur Seldon (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1961), pp. 38-40.

CHAPTER FIVE
AN ASSESSMENT OF HAYEK
We have now covered the most important elements of
Hayek's political philosophy.

He has confronted charges

that the capitalist distribution of income is immoral by
insisting that we judge capitalism in terms of the available
alternatives, rather than by an absolute ideal.
natives

The alter-

to capitalism all require government intervention

in the economy, Hayek argues, and government cannot possibly
coordinate the simultaneous pursuit of diverse goals by
millions of individuals with the speed or precision of the
market.

Further, Hayek claims that the historical pattern

of government intervention in the economy bas consistently
compromised the Rule of Law; by depriving citizens of a
legal order that is known, stable, certain, and equal, government intervention has imperiled liberty and made it very
difficult for private citizens to formulate coherent plans
for theirom actions.

Finally, we have seen that Hayek does

favor some government steps to intervene in the economy,
but makes this amendment to the body of his philosophy conditional upon the demonstrated incapacity of the market
mechanism to perform certain carefully specified functions,
and insists that the resulting government programs should
adhere to the Rule of Law as closely as possible.
96
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Our remaining tasks are two.

This Chapter will be

concerned with the first, an assessment of the strengths and
. weaknesses of Hayek's defense of the free market.

In Chapter

Six we will undertake the second, putting forward certain
amendments to Hayek's philosophy with the intention of
strengthening his defense of the market.
We will begin by considering the strengths of Hayek's
defense of capitalism.

Hayek is very effective in explaining

why capitalist economies are so productive.

His demonstra-

tion focuses on the flexibility of the market economy, and
he argues effectively that capitalism has an invaluable
ability to reconcile consumers' and producers' desires and
abilities.

His argument makes the point that capitalism can

prevent economic stagnation by creating a network of incentives. and opportunities for experimentation, and by providing
through the market a "feedback channel" for showing which experiments have succeeded in satisfying other people's desires.
Only through

~uch

ongoing innovation can we encourage popular

and beneficial experiments while frustrating the growth of
. 1 ess nove
. lt.1es. 183
use

The obverse of this argument, that government direction of the economy will seriously diminish productivity, is
183wa tk'1ns, p. 35.
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equally compelling in Hayek's hands.

Because the operation

of the market is so swift and subtle, because its consequences
are so difficult to anticipate, even the most earnest and
noble government steps are certain to snare the market's processes and devitalize the economy.

With his economist's

ability to trace long chains of cause and effect, Hayek succeeds in showing that the harmful effects of government intervention are more profound than generally realized.

The

factory that is not built because of high taxes, the jobs
that are not created, the entrepreneurial idea not pursued
beqause of regulatory obstacles--Hayek is able to convey the
tangibility of these losses, and thereby show the dimensions
of the government's ability to damage the economy.
A second strength of Hayek's defense of capitalism
is that his political analysis of the problems of government
intervention in the economy is as persuasive as his discussion of the econndc consequences.

Hayek shows that govern-

ment programs alter the political environment, creating new
interests and expectations.
of government

interventio~

As a consequence, the possibility
of limited scope or duration is

very small; the incentives all favor continued and expanded
government activity.

Milton Friedman has cleverly para-

phrased Adam Smith regarding the disappointemnts of good
intentions:

"An individual who intends only to serve the

public interest is 'led by an invisible hand to promote'
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private interests, which was no part of his intention.•"

184

Hayek concludes flatly that the nearly inevitable result of
even the noblest government programs is "the protection of
certain groups against the necessity to descend from the
absolute or relative material position which they have for
185
some time enjoyed."
Hayek's development of the theory of the Rule of Law
is an impressive achievement in itself, but it is also an
effective antidote to this very problem, the tendency of
modern politics to degenerate into the accumulation of subsidies and advantages.

The Rule of Law provides an exacting

procedura.l ·. standard for judging, resisting, and perhaps
arresting this disturbing trend.

Hayek would concur with

the cautious wisdom of Oakeshott:
An "umpire" who at the same time is one of the players
is no umpire; "rules" about which we are not disposed
to be conservative are not rules but incitements to
disorder; the conjunction of dreaming and ruling
generates tyranny.l86
The final strength of Hayek's position is his acknowledgment that while the market is good it is not perfect, and
184F r1euman,
· ~
· F ree to Ch oose,
.
pp. 5- 6 •
185Hayek, New Studies, pp. 186186Ridgely Hill Pate, Russell Kirk, Friedrich Hayek,
and Peter Viereck: Three Positions in Contemporary Conservative Thought (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Texas at
Austin), p: 170, citing Michael Oakenshott, Rationalism in
Politics, p. 194.
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government intervention, while problem&tic, is not doomed
to failure.

Consequent1.y, Hayek argues in f.3.vor of many of

the goals of the welfare state, suggesting even that his
main concern is with the way government pursues social
policy, rather than the pursuit itself.

Hayek's amending

his theories on this point may be a tactical concession.

He

says that the market's defenders must come.to grips with the
moral environment of the day, which calls for more economic
..
187
equality and security than capitalism is likely to prov1de.
But even Hayek's pragmatism is commendable here, I think, if
only for leavening what could otherwise be a narrow, dogmatic reliance on the procedures of good law.
We turn now to the examination of the weaknesses of
Hayek's treatment of the

question~of

the common good, second,

his attitude towards certain self-destructive tendencies of
capitalism, and third, Hayek's moral relativism.

Regarding

the common good, we note that Hayek has a purely additive
conception of it.

That is, the only conception of the com-

mon good Hayek will accept is the sum of pri~ate interests.

187Hayek, Individualism, p. 109.
188Hayek, Mirage, pp. 1-5.

188
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The spontaneous order makes the greatest contributions "for
everyone a.nd therefore for the general welfare." 189 Hayek's
common good is little more than a play on words; it denies
the possibility of the common-ness of any good, of communal
or social benefits.

The additive common good is, for all

practical purposes, the same as prosperity, and prosperity,
as Irving Kristol has pointed out, is too· weak an ideal to
maintain popular allegiance to a social or economic system.l

90

When Hayek.does consider a more encompassing notion
of the common good, one that calls for civic unity as regards certain pursuits, Hayek unfailingly reduces this common
good to a straw man.

He derides an egalitarian who has termed

the goal of politics "as the removal of all sources of dis.

content."

191

This is, of course, a fatuous position.

But

Hayek insists on treating it as the representative expression of the idea of the common good.

He refuses to accept

the idea that one can articulate certain general goals for a
society without getting enmeshed in the determination of
every facet of life.

"All attempts to model the Great

Society on the image of the familiar group, or to turn it
into a community by directing the individual towards· common
189Hayek, Rules and Order, pp. 132-133.
190
.
Kristol,
Capitalism, p. 191.
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visible purposes, must produce a totalitarian society." 192
It is one thing to say that there is a tendency for the
growth of government to perpetuate itself, quite another to
· assert that reasonable men cannot define and pursue common
goals in such a way that individual liberties are
respected.

193

Hayek's misperception of the nature of the common
good is accompanied by a misperception of the desire for
it.

Arthur Seldon describes such desires succinctly:
The risks and sanctions of the market process must
receive the moral allegiance of the people. The
market must be seen not only as efficient but as
good and satisfying ~~atever canons of justice are
reg~rded as proper.l

But Hayek denies that we can apply any canons of justice
to society, or even that we can gradually approach the common good by eliminating those social evils widely regarded
as abhorrent.

195

The decent conviction that a good society

cannot abide certain grevious ills is thus pushed aside.
For all his acumen in discussing the workings of capitalism
l9 2 Hayek, Mirage,

p. 147. (Emphasis mine.)

193 see E. F. M. Durbin, "Professor Hayek on Ec·onomic
· Planning and Political Liberty," Economic Journal 55
(December 1945): 360-365.

·l 9 ~eldon, Introduction, in Seldon, pp. 11-12.
195Haye k , M.1rage, p. 78.
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and the consequences of circumscribing it, Hayek seems incapable of that quality of imagination that would allow him
to understand the attraction of interfering in the market to
.
196
~orrect severe problems.
Not only is Hayek's treatment of the common good,
confused and perhaps unfair, a problem in itself, but it
causes serious difficulties for the whole of his defense
of capitalism.

Having agreed tnat the market's defenders

must accept the widespread desire for government programs
that alter the market's results, Hayek has embraced the goals,
if not the means, of the modern welfare state.

Having made

this concession Hayek tries to preserve the market order by
calling for government intervention to accord with the Rule
of Law as much as possible.

But ijayek has no framework for

telling us how much adherence to the Rule of Law is possible.
In the absence of any conception of the common good, which
could be used to weigh

trade-offs among equality,

efficiency, and liberty, Hayek provides no criteria for
making policy decisions.

One can thus expect that the

political realization of Hayek's philosophy will not affect
the modern welfare state all that much.

Someone must decide

to what extent following the Rule of Law is possible, and
196 Ronald Max Hartwell, "Capitalism and the Historians,"
in Machlup, p. 92.
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since Hayek does not tell us, the decision seems likely to
rest with those who currently administer the welfare state,
and who have at least

a-

clear picture of their goals, if not

the procedural strictures they ought to serve.
Hayek's explanations of why certain welfare state
programs will not endanger liberty and progress ring false
due to the lack of any comprehe?sive framework for considering social policy.

It would be more reasonable to say that

sacrificing a measure of the freedom necessary for the
spontaneous order to obtain a measure of security or equality
is a good bargain than to pretend, as Hayek seems to do, that
the right kind of welfare state does not diminish liberty.
But Hayek absolutely cannot take a balancing approach because
I

I

it makes progress a value comparable to others, all of which
reasonable people can assess and weigh; progress remains an
absolute value, beyond criticism because its future course
.
.
197
~n unknown.
So while Hayek clearly favors government
activity beyond the night watchman state, it is unclear how
much farther he is willing to go.

The unyielding position

of Milton Friedman or Robert Nozick seems, by comparison,
much more lucid.

198

So, Hayek's efforts to promote capitalism

. 197Philip w. Dwyer and R. Harrison Hickman, "American
Conservatism and F.A. Hayek," Modern Age 23 (Fall 1979): 387.
198wilhelm, pp. 180-181.
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while accomodating the moral resistance to it appear stymied
by the absence of any device in Hayek's thought for mediating the two aims.
A second area in which Hayek's defense of the market
is inadequate is his treatment of the self-destructive tendencies of capitalism.

Hyperactive government may well be

the greatest threat to the free market.

But if certain

trends within capitalism could destroy it from within, wise
government policies may be the only way to secure the future
of the market.

Just such a trend is the reduction of com-

petitors by attrition, until enormous corporations control
vast sections of many markets.

In capital-intensive indus-

tries, like steel and automobiles, the costs of an initial
investment are so great that the threat from new corporations is nil, while retooling costs might be so high that
smaller firms have great trouble staving off the giants.
Even in less capital-intensive sectors, such as the service
industries, large firms can amass marketing and research
teams with formidable expertise.

Clearly, it is possible

for capitalism to winnow ,out the great majority of capitalists, and in the process to all but eliminate the competition and experimentation that justifies capitalism.
Hayek never deals fully with this problem.

He seems

determined to focus solely on the government threat to the
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to the market.

So he states, but does not really argue,

that government is the chief cause of monopoly, as a result
of tariffs, patents, and laws governing corporations.

199

He

·insists, notwithstanding fears to the contrary, that corporate giantism is not inimical to competition, and the
potential of such firms to wield unacceptable economic and
social power is exaggerated. 200

Hayek may be right; there

is an argument to be made that in the long run government
regulation of monopoly is ineffective.

But on an issue of

this importance, about which so many people have misgivings,
Hayek really should provide more guidance.
There is a second respect in which capitalism poses
a threat to its own survival.

This is the tendency of the

experience of life under modern ciapitalism to lead people
to develop attitudes that are inimical to the existence
of capitalism.
problem.

To his credit, Hayek acknowledges the

He points out that modern capitalism is charac-

terized by the existence of many large corporations with
thousands of employees.
perspective of an

People who view society from the

employ~e

are unlikely to appreciate the

importance of individual entrepreneurs.

They will be

199Hayek, New Studies, p. 146.
200Hayek, Political Order, pp. 79-80.
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receptive to political programs that enhance employees'
security, while being unconcerned about taxes and regulations
that stifle small businesses.
~hink

Hayek laments the tendency to

of society in terms of one large organization rather

than diverse competing ones.

But he confines his remedy to

a reiteration of the continuing importance of-the entrepreneurial pathfinder, a solution of much narrower scope
than the problem.

201

Indeed, others have examined this same area and found
the problems of the attitudes nurtured by capitalism to be
even more serious that Hayek imagines.

Daniel Bell has

argued that capitalism, especially in America, is beset by
a hug€?, "cultural contradiction."
calls for diligence, sobriety,

The "production ethic"

an~

frugality, while the

modern "consumption ethic" urges instant gratification, comfort, leisure, and self-indulgence. "One is to be 'straight'
202
by day and a 'swinger' by night."
The resulting frustration and confusion is most severe.

Equally frustrating and

contradictory is the growing importance attached to "positional goods."

A robust market economy may provide virtuall-Y

201Hayek, Constitution, pp. 118-130; and Hayek Mirage,
pp. 134-135.
202naniel Bell~ The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 1976), pp. 71-72, 84.
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everyone with a good education and a comfortable home, but
is cannot possibly give more than a few schooling at an
"elite" institution,
hoods.

or

a house in one of the "best" neighbor-

As capitalism has succeeded in satisfying mass demands

for mass-produced consumption items, the focus of the upwardly mobile has turned towards positional goods that are
intrinsically limited.

The discovery of such limits has

come as a shock to those who took capital ism • s promise to be
an ever-improving standard of li~ing. 203

Having already

indicated the importance of adjusting the case for capitalism
to account for the moral sentiments of the time, Hayek (and
his followers) need to take these newer attitudes under
serious consideration.

Further, he needs to construct

a defense of capitalism that is compelling enough that those
who live in a market economy can see it virtues

despite the

vicissitudes of daily lfie.
The third area in which Hayek's political philosophy
is vulnerable is its moral relativism.

Hayek writes:

But the gravest deficiency of the older prohpets
[such as Moses] was their.belief that the intuitively perceived ethical values, divined out of the
depth of man's breast, were immutable and eternal.
This prevented them from recognizing that a11· rules
of conduct served a particular kind of order to
soc~ety, and that, though such a society will find it
203K r1.s
. t o 1 , pp. 32-37.

See also; Will, pp. 97-99.
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necessary to enforce its rules of conduct in order
to protect itself.against di$ruption, it is not
society with a given structure that creates the rules
appropriate to it, but the rules which have been practised by a few ~nd then imitated by many which created
a social order of a particular kind. Tradition is
not something constant:but the product of a process of
selection guided not by reason but by success.
It
changes but can rarely be deliberately changed. Cultural selection is not a rational process; it is not
guided by but it creates reason.20~ Hayek does qualify tis idea of historical change in
a way that staves off utter relativism.

He insists that

since reason is a creature of history it is impossible for
reason to rise above history and pretend to apprehend standards by which to criticize tradition.

205

Accordingly,

Hayek rejects the claims of the discovery of the meaning of
history by Hegel, Marx, or Comte.

206

And he cautions that

the supposition that we can think our way out of traditional
moral restraints is a conceit that harbors terrible savagery;
civilization requires acceptance of the products of the
evolution of morals.

207

But however cautious a relativist he may be, Hayek
still denies that there is any fixed point in the
20

~Hayek, Political Order, p. 166.

205
206
207

Hayek, New Studies, p. 20.
Hayek, Rules and Order, pp. 23-24.
Hayek, Political Order, p. 174.

mora~
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universe, or any evil that time and progress may not render
good.

This posture is. intrinsically objectionable for

several reasons.

Fir~t,

despite his protestations about

. respect for tradition, Hayek finds himself denigrating the
moral foundations of the West.

H.B. Acton agrees that some

mores will evolve in response to circumstances, but says
that it is almost nihilistic for Hayek to claim that all
moral precepts, even the decalogue or the Golden Rule, are·
subject to the same erosion.

208

David Lewis Schaefer scoffs

at the idea that the moral teachings of Moses, Plato, or
Rousseau have been rendered obsolete because of their failure to appreciate "the contribution that the market economy
makes to the ad~ancement of ci~ilization."

209

Hayek's deliberate dissociation from t"he traditional
understanding of morality (as distinguished from precepts
of traditional morality) leaves him incapable, apparently,
of understanding the moral earnestness of the opposition to
capitalism.

~ayek

can attribute the widespread revulsion

for materialism to "socialist teaching."

210

And he claims

. 208H.B. Acton, "Objectives," in Seldon, pp. 77-78~
209

na~id Lewis Schaefer, review of The Political Order
of a Free People, American Political Science Review 74 (March
1980): 166.
210Hayek," Road to Serfdom, p. 130.
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that the "civilizing forces of commerce," which promote
such virtues as kindness and "consideration of the weak
211
and infirm," have been overlooked.
Hayek ought to have
.considered more seriously the possibility of a deeper basis
for the aversion to capitalism, or that consideration of
the weak might issue in efforts to enlist the government
in their protection.
A second respect in which Hayek's teaching about
history and our relation to it is internally flawed is his
inability to make clear to what extent history is beyond
deliberate human cqntrol.

Hayek seems to waver, sometimes

rejecting the "fatalistic" belief that you can't turn back
the clock, sometimes expressing doubts that the trend to-

. 1'1sm 1s
. revers1'bl e. 212,
war d s soc1a
.
'

Barbara Wooton has

pointed out the anomaly of Hayek's devoting a chapter of
The Road to Serfdom to "Why the Worst Get on Top," since
the thesis of that book seems to be that planning is hor.
213
rific no matter who gets on top.
Thirdly, Hayek's notion of historical evolution seems
at variance with much of what we know about history.

211 Ibid., pp. 148-149.
212 Seldon, p. 11; See Hayek, Constitution, pp. 284, 304.
213 Wooton, Freedom, footnote, p. 37.
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According to Hayek, "The growth of what we call civilization
is due to this principle of a person's responsibility for
his actions and their

~onsequences,

and the freedom to pursue

his own ends without having to obey the leader of the band
to which he belongs." 214 Individual freedom certainly explains in part the growth of civilization.

But there is no

evidence to suggest that absolute monarchy, or voo doo, or
trial by torture declined as principles of social organization because they were practiced by groups who gradually
gave way to groups not organized along these lines. 215 Nor
is it fair for Hayek to portray capitalism as spontaneously
emergent while attributing anti-capitalist sentiments to the
manipulations of intellectuals.

Milton Fisk argues that

many reform movements or revolutions flare up in history as
if by spontaneous combustion, while capitalism has often been
propped up by deliberately chosen policies. 216 Hayek clearly
seems to have mistaken an aspect of the process of historical
change for the whole of it.
214 nayek, New Studies, p. 299.
215 Jacob Viner, "Hayek on Freedom and Coercion,"
Southern Economic Journal 27 (January 1961): 235 •
. 216 Milton Fisk, review of Rules and Order, Philosophical ·Review 85 (July 1976): 429-432.

113
Apart from these inherent difficulties of Hayek's
relativism, showing careless scholarship or implausible
moral reasoning, Hayek's relativism is destructive of his
larger attempt at defending capitalism.

It is so in the

general sense in which any thinker's relativism tends to cut
the ground from under him, trivializing any points he is
trying to advance.

For example, by arguing that longevity

bestows legitimacy on institutions, Hayek leaves his theory
vulnerable to being used to justify egalitarianism.

If

Hayek's ideal is progress attained through unplanned experimentation, he would seem to be defending most of the welfare
state as currently administered, which has, by now, a long
history of incremental adaptation. 217 Hayek has compromised
his own ability to criticize egalitarianism or advocate
capitalism.
More specifically, Hayek's relativism limits his
ability to put forward a moral defense of the market.

Hayek

understands the need for such a defense of the market clearly
enough.

He points out that the benefits of government inter-

vention are usually far more tangible than its costs, and
the shortcomings of capitalism are generally more visible
217 Eugene F. Miller, "Hayek's Critique of Reason,"
Modern Age 20 (Fall 1976): 392-393; Samuel Brittan, "Hayek,
the New Right, and the Crisis of Social Democracy," Encounter
54 (January 1980): 33-35.
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than its virtues.

If capitalism is defended on the basis of

its results, Hayek concludes, it will lose every time, because these results are so difficult to perceive.

Therefore,

Hayek insists that the only effective defense of capitalism
must be in terms of principle.

Only by conveying the im-

portance of principles such as the protected sphere for
individual liberty can the market win the allegiance of the
people. 218

But of course, those thoroughly familiar with

Hayek's philosophy will realize that the principles that he
appeals to are products of a certain type of civilization,
and constantly subject to revision.

They will be accepted

as a sufficient defense of the market only by those who do
not know, as Hayek's followers do, that progress is the
essence of civilization, and no moral principle is immune
to progress.

Hayek is, in effect, calling for a principled

defense of a system whose leading feature, according to him,
is that it is unfettered by any immutable and eternal
ethical principles.
The charitable interpretation of this anomaly is that
Hayek is confused.

The more plausible explanation is that

his moral defense of capitalism is Hayek's Noble Lie, the
218 Hayek, Constitution, pp. 67-68; Hayek, Rules and
· ·order, pp. 56-57.
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only device for reconciling the multitude to an economic
system they cannot understand.
consequences.

This effort has paradoxical

We have seen that Hayek is tempted to regard

as artificial what appears to be genuine and spontaneous-the moral revulsion against the inequalities of capitalism.
It now seems that he wishes to pass off as genuine moral
attitudes he himself believes to be confused.

This is

hardly a reassuring start for the moral defense of capitalism.

It promises a future of ever more elaborate deception,

trying to deny real sentiments and defend inculcated ones.
Whether those who engage in such an enterprise are in a
position to make a moral defense of anything is.an open
question.

t

CHAPTER SIX
CAPITALISM AND THE COMMON GOOD
On the basis of our examination in the last chapter we
may put forward two conclusions.

First, Hayek's project--

the justification of the market in terms consonant with
moral sensibilities of our times--is worth doing.

A pros-

perous economy is a prerequisite for rescuing millions from·
poverty, and there is no substitute for the market mechanism
in promoting and maintaining prosperity.

Furthermore, capi-

talism is so closely related to the Rule of Law that it is
impossible to follow the latter without substantially protecting the former.

The second conclusion is that Hayek has

not successfully completed this project.

His argument on

behalf of a modifieq capitalism is neither clear nor convincing; Hayek has not reconciled his defense of the market
with his acceptance of government alterations of it.

Hayek's

lack, of conviction seems to have worn off on his effort to
provide a moral justification for capitalism, which is
especially unpersuasive.
This chapter will suggest a different approach to the
construction of a defense of the market.

The argument here

. will rely heavily, though not exclusively, on the political
116

117

thought of Bertrand de Jouvenel, contained in his books,
Sovereignty and The Ethics of RedistribUtion.

Jouvenel's

political writings are __neither so voluniinous nor as systematic as Hayek's; he grants that their purpose is "suggestive
rather than didactic." 219

But Jouvenel provides an illumi-

nating contrast with Hayek--because their perspectives are
similar in many ways, the remaining differences are often
important.
For example, Jouvenel shares Hayek's fundamental insight about the nature of social organization..

Jouvenel sees

modern social life as a "web of infinite complexity," far
more intricate than what Hayek would call face-to-:-face
society.

22

°

Consequently, Jouvenel is as dubious as Hayek

regarding the possibility of social reform based on comprehensive knowledge of society.

Jouvenel writes:

[I do] not believe that it is possible even for the
most powerful intelligence to envisage in advance
all future possibilities of • • • co~operation, and
[I] cannot for that reason.take the view that it needs
to be built up in successive stages from a single
organising centre. The cause of its enrichment [I
find] is the unfailing sup~2~ of fresh initiatives
taken independently; • • •
219Bertrand de Jouvenel, Sovereignty:

An Inquiry Into
the.Political Good, translated by J.F. Huntington (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 295.
220

Ibid., p. 2.

2211, . d
01

• '

pp. 10-11.
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Jouvenel resembles Hayek again when he notes "the
miracle of society," the fact that the absence of a central
organizing force does-not render social life chaotic; dependent as we are on the behavior of innumerable strangers, we
can ·proceed with great confidence that their behavior will
meet our expectations. 222 Unlike Hayek, however, who attributes this miracle to society's capacity for spontaneous
order, Jouvenel says that the basis of modern social life
is the "institutionalization of trust."

Society coheres if

it maintains a common code of behavior and a mutually
accepted moral outlook.

Uncertainity about the feelings,

thoughts, and actions of others is the source of estrangement in modern life that causes citizens to feel like aliens
in their own country, and causes social life to crumble. 223
And unlike Hayek, Jouvenel feels that modern society is
particularly in need of reassurance and stability regarding these basic qualities.

The more rapidly the material

c.ircumstances of ·life change the more desperately men need
a durable touchstone for security and confidence. 224
222 Ibid., pp. 115-116.
223 Ibid.
224

Ib1" d., p. 104 •
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Because Jouvenel shares Hayek's opinion about the complexity of modern society, he shares some of Hayek's misgivings about the pursuit of the common good.

"It is not

the office of the public authority to pursue personal goods
of individuals," Jouvenel writes; government cannot know what
these goods are, and cannot pursue them without trampling
liberty.

225

But because Jouvenel sees a perishable founda-

tion of social life, he takes a position on the common good
different from Hayek.

Jouvenel says that the common good

will consist in, and require the defense of, certain fundamental conditions essential to the continued existence of
society. These include the protection of a nation's territorial integrity, and the preservation of the material and
moral bases of social life.

Jouvenel summarizes these goals

by saying that the common good of any society is the social
bond itself.

Wise politics is permeated by the knowledge

of the precariousness of social order, and the need to attend
constantly to its defense and preser~ation.

226

Jouvene1's conception of the common good corrects a
major defect in Hayek's theory.

If we think of the mainten:

ance of the conditions of social life as the overarching
225

rbid., pp. 109-112.

226 rbid., pp. 112-114, 123-129.
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common good, we must break with Hayek in his treatment of
spontaneously generated progress as an absolute value.
Jouvenel's common

good_~akes

the free market a feature of

the good society, but does not grant pre-eminence to it.
our

e~forts

In

to preserve our society we will carefully con-

sider the market's contribution to generating-wealth and
preserving freedom.

Society cannot cohere when these quali-

ties are absent or disappearing.

But society also needs to

redress glaring inequalities, and to be able to satisfy itself that it has treated its weakest members humanely, and
these requirements of the common good may necessitate curtailing the free market.

The common good, then, provides

the framework that we need to undertake the modifications of
capitalism which Hayek, and many others, have called for.
Reasonable people will disagree about whether particular
trade-offs promote the common good.

But the idea itself

will focus and guide public policy debates in a way that
Hayek's incomplete theory cannot.
It is true, as Hayek and Jouvenel recognize, that
the common good can be made a pretext for incursions on
liberty, both petty and terrifying.
cannot be given on this point.

Perfect reassurance

But Jouvenel's conception

of the common good ought to lend itself to the reasonable
distinction between matters that endanger the social order
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and those that do not.

The common good is no less dependent

on reasonableness within the political order than other
conceptual frameworks

f~r

politics.

Hayek's hopes for the

modification of capitalism are, as we have seen, heavily
depen.dent on the good sense of the governors.

But Jouvenel

does not allow his political thought to be paralyzed by the
possibility that his ideas will be abused by unreasonable
people.

So where Jouvenel agrees with Hayek that absolute

social justice, in a society of modern complexity, is impossible, Jouvenel does not go on to say, as Hayek does,
that the whole idea of social justice is therefore a mirage.
According to Jouvenel, justice is in one sense "a quality of
human will."

Rather than blandly accepting whatever social

arrangements emerge as social life develops, we must try to
see that "the whole ceaseless process of change should be
increasingly permeated by the quality of social justice in

. d 1v1
... d ua 1 w1.11 s. " 227
our 1n

So while there might not be

social justice, there will be social injustice if we callously accept any arrangements that, as Hayek would say,
emerge spontaneously.

Th~

victims of this injustice will

include not only the poor but the whole society as a moral
entity.
------~~=-----------

227Ibid., pp. 164-165.
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Hayek 1 s very different stand on the common good is
based on a political perception that is not only different
from Jouvenel 1 s, but flawed in a fundamental way.

Hayek is

greatly concerned about the preservation of the abstract
quality of order.

So far is he from a concern for particu-

lar political orders that he states that the culmination of
politics, in his view, would be the decline of nationalism
. t y. 228
an d th e emergence o f a wor ld soc1e

But Hayek has to

admit that all human history to date has been in particular,
"factual" orders, rather than in the experience of the sheer
abstract quality of order.

229

This acknowledgment undercuts

his attempts to formulate a purely procedural guide to
politics, because his procedural strictures will be subject
to varying applications according to the requirements of
230
different political orders.
Jouvenel, by contract, deals directly with the fact
of different political orders.

"To consider groups as

secondary pheonomena resulting from a synthesis of individuals is a wrong approach; they should be regarded as

228Hayek, Studies, pp. 163-164i Hayek, Individualism,
pp. 28-29.
229 Hayek, Mirage, pp. 56-59.
230 Richard Vernon, The 1 Great Society' and the "open
Society': Liberalism in Hayek and Popper," Canadian Journal of
Political Science 9 (June 1976): 265-271.
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primary phenomena of human existence."

231

The origins of

.

groups are in authority, and this quality of authority is
anything but abstract,- says Jouvenel.

Authority begins in

'the "natural ascendency" of certain men, of the sort that
can be seen to emerge spontaneously in times of emergency,
such as a fire or accident.

232

This leadership is the

quality that creates and maintains groups, "the efficient
cause of voluntary organizations."

233

As the organizations

grow in size and complexity, authority_becomes institutionalized, and the maintenance of existing social orders
becomes the task of politics.

234

One upshot of these differences is that Jouvenel's
political theory is capable of giving a helpful account of
the fact of occasional political crises that threaten a
regime's existence while Hayek's philosophy is not beneficial on this point.

Hayek's political philosophy is tailored

for a political order where all great issues have already
been resolved, and the problem is to preserve and enhance a
231 Jouvenel, Sovereignty, p. 56.
232 Ibid., p. 32.
233 Ibid., pp. 28-31.
234 Ibid., pp. 19-20.
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functioning system.

Jouvenel calls the type of authority

needed here the office of adjustment, and says that it must
superintend the incremental adjustments necessary to maintain
'the contours of social life.

But Jouvenel speaks of another

type of authority that has no analogue in Hayek's thought,
the office of leadership. -Every society periodically

con~

fronts profound crises that pose imminent dangers to the
nation.

The office of adjustment cannot cope with such a

challenge, and the office of leadership must confront the
crisis by organizing a great, vital, public endeavor, such
as a war or social reformation.

These offices are not to

be understood as formal branches of government, but as
qualities of the political order itself, a nation's ordinary
and extraordinary understanding of its own existence.

By

confining himself to the shallows of politics, Hayek is
unable to appreciate the intensity of the feelings or actions
that regard the preservation of a venerable way of life. 235
We conclude this discussion of the common good by
'

.

saying that it, and Jouvenel·' s position generally, provide
a centripetal force in political theory, capable of overcoming the dangerous centrifugal tendencies of Hayek's
thought.
235

Jouvenel asserts that political science is a moral
Ibid., pp. 40-55 •.

125
science.

The intercourse of humans in society requires a

"common stock of beliefs and a similar structure of feelings."
Men can live in society because they share a "common moral
language," he says, and if this language breaks apart, society
W]..ll

·d1"ssolve also. 236

Haye k , f or a 11 h"1s concern a b ou t

liberty, does not attach much importance to the inculcation
of a devotion to liberty among the people or the governors.
If Hayek is right about people being preoccupied with private
interests, such a teaching is especially important if liberty
is to endure.

237

The common good also appears to remedy the second main
defect of Hayek's theory, the consideration of the self-destructive tendencies of capitalism.

Because it provides a

framework where we can consider trade-offs in the public
interest, the idea of the common good can structure discussions about anti-trust policy.

Again, the common good will

not be the last word on deciding at what point corporate
power must be checked by government power.

But it can be a

starting point, framing the discussion in terms of what
qualities we need from the market in maintaining the material
foundations of society, so that we can proceed to ascertain
whether a particular economic structure satisfies or

236Ibid., pp. 303-304.
2 37Wilhelm, p. 181.
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frustrates that need.

Further, by placing the case for

capitalism in the context of the larger concern for the preservation of the social order, the comm.on good provides a
'basis for resolving the cultural contradictions of capitalism.
Rather than considering consumption and production sui
generis, and tolerating growing dicontinuities between the
two halves of the economic process, the common good relates
them both to a larger purpose.

In so doing it facilitates

public and private efforts to adapt the economic processes
to the common moral language, and to prevent excesses where
the economy transgresses the collective moral vision.
The final shortcoming of Hayek's theory is its moral
relativism, and this is the most difficult to dispute.
i

Hayek's position that moral opinions are subjective and
cannot be legitimately imposed on others is probably the
facet of his thought most congenial to modern sensibilities.
Hayek claims to have been influenced by David Hume more
strongly than by any other philosopher, and Hume's epistemelogical barriers have certainly kept many people besides
.
238
Hayek from believing in objective moral standards. .
From what we have seen of Jouvenel so far, his
theories may appear ill-suited to a -refutation of moral
relativism.

If the common good is the social bond itself,

238Hayek, New Studies, p. 264.
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different societies will require different common goods.

In

light of this, Jouvenel's moral criteria seem to vary as
much as Hayek's.

But this interpretation is at odds with

the tenor of Jouvenel's thought.

I do not understand Jouvenel

to be saying that the common good is good simply because it
is common--that the preservation of Naziism is good in the
context of Nazi Germany.

Rather, it seems that the common

good must indeed be good for Jouvenel, must accord with the
development of what is best in human nature.

Regarding the

subject of economic policy, for example, Jouvenel insists
that the good life is not a "buyer's spree," an attitude he
finds in the arguments of opponents and defenders of capitalism.

Civil life requ.i:res a correct understanding of the

limited importance of economics, he says.

The purpose of

economic activity is not the indefinite increase of private
luxury, "gnawing the income bone," but the facilitation of
more important goals.

Economic activity ought to conduce to

increasing the·sociability of men, and improving their moral,
intellectual, and aesthetic character. 239
It does not appear, then, that Jouvenel's common good
necessarily leads us into moral relativism.

It is not with-

out difficulties, particularly in terms of reconciling
239

Jo~venel, Ethics, pp. 45-48, 53-55.
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universal needs of men with the requirements of particular
nations with particular customs.
ance to the latter

ra~ses

To attach too much import-

the prospect of de facto relati-

.vism, while to insistently stress the former could lead to
brittle absolutism.
panacea.

The common good is not, to repeat, a

But it does provide a basis for the resolution of

the problem confronted by Hayek, the adjustment of the market processes to the prevailing notions of fairness.

Hayek's

cautionary remarks about the consequences of disturbing the
market order are instructive, but become useful guides only
within the context of the ongoing effort to promote the good
life for man within stable political orders.

129
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Works by Hayek
Hayek, Friedrich A. 'The· ·Road to Serfdom.
of Chicago Press, 1944.

Chicago:

Individualism and Economic Order.
versity of Chicago Press, 1947.

University

Chicago:

Uni-

The Sensory Order: An Inquiry Into the Foundations
of Theoretical Psychology. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1952.
The Constitution of Liberty.
of Chicago Press, 1960.

Chicago:

University

Studies in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967.
------~-·Law,

Legislation, and Liberty. 3 vols.
University of Chicago Press, 1973-79.

Chicago:

New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and
the History of Ideas. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1978.
Works About Hayek
Brittan, Samuel. "Hayek, the New Right, and the Crisis of
Social Democracy." Encounter 54 (January 1980): 31-46.
de Crespigny, Anthony. "Hayek: Freedom for Progress." In
Contemporary Political Philosophers, pp. 49-66 Edited
by Anthony de Crespigny and Kenneth Minogue, N~w York:
Dodd, Mead & Co., 1975.
Durbin, E.F.M. "Professor Hayek on Economic Planning and
Political Liberty." Economic Journal 55 (December 1945):
357-70.
DWyer, Philip· W. and Hickman, R. Harrison. "American Conservatism and F.A. Hayek." Modern Age 23 (Fall 1979): 381-93.

130
Fisk, Milton. Review of Law, Legislation, and Liberty, vol. 1,
by Friedrich A. Hayek, in Philosophical Review 85 (July
1976): 429-432.
Levinson, Sanford. Review of Law, Legislation, and Liberty,
vol. 2, by.Friedrich A. Hayek, in American Political
Science Review 72 (September 1978): 1026-1027.
Machlup, Fritz, ed. Essays on Hayek. Foreword by Milton Friedman. New York: New York University Press, 1976.
Meiklejohn, Donald. Review of Law, Legislation, and Liberty
vols. 1 and 2, by Friedrich A. Hayek, in Ethics 88
(January 1978): 178-184.
Miller, Eugene F. "Hayek's Critique of Reason."
20 (Fall 1976): 383-94.

Modern Age

Pate, Ridgely Hill. "Russell Kirk, Freidrich Hayek, and
Peter Viereck: Three Positions in Contemporary Conservative Thought." Ph.D. dissertation, Unviersity of Texas
at Austin, 1970.
Lord Robbins.
"Hayek on Liberty."
1961): 66-81.

Economics 28 (February

Schaefer, David.Lewis. Review of Law, Legislation, and
Liberty, vol. 3, by Friedrich A. Hayek, in American
Political Science Review 74 (March 1980): 165-166.
Seldon, Arthur, ed. Agenda for a Free Society: Essays on
Hayek's "The Constitution of Liberty". London: Hutchinson & Co., 1961.
Vernon, Richard. ·"The 'Great Society• and the 'Open Soceity• :_
Liberalism in Hayek and Popper." Canadian Journal of
··Political Science 9 (June 1976): 261-76.
Viner,. Jacob. . "Hayek. on Freedom and Coercion." Southern
· Economic Journal 27 (January 1961): 230-236.
Wilhelm, Morris M•. "The Political Thought of Friedrich A.
Hayek." Political Studies 20 (June 1972): 169-84.
Wooton, Barbara. Freedom Under Planning. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1945.

131
Other Works
Arthur, John and Shaw, William H., eds.· Justice and Economic
'Distribution. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1978.
Bedau, Hugo A., ed. Justice and Equality.
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971.

Englewood Cliffs,

Bell, Daniel. The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism.
New York: Basic Books, 1976.
Bell, Daniel.
"On Meritocracy and Equality."
Interest 29 (Fall 1972): 24-68.

The Public

Blum, Walter J •. and Kalvin, Harry, Jr. The Uneasy Case for
Progressive Taxation. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1953.
Burke, Edmund. Relfections on the Revolution in France.
Introduction by Russell Kirk. Chicago: Henry
Regnery, 1955.
Coser, Lewis A. and Howe, Irving, eds. The New Conservatives:
A Critique From the Left. New York: Quadrangle, 1974.
I

Friedman, Milton, Capitalism and Freedom.
sity of Chicago Press, 1962.

Chicago:

Friedman, Milton and Friedman, Rose. Free to Choose.
York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1979.
Galbraith, John Kenneth. The Affluent Societx.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969.
Gans, Herbert J. More Equality. New York:
1968; Vintage Press, 1974.

UniverNew

2nd ed.

Random House,

Gardner, John w. Excellence: Can We Be Equal and Excellent
·Too? New York: Harper & Row, 1961.
Harrington, Michael; ·socialism.
Press, 1970.

New York:

Saturday Review

132

Hume, David. The Philosophical Works. Edited by Thomas Hill
Green and Thomas Hodge Grose. 1882; reprinted., Durmstead, Germany: Scientia Verlay Aalin, 1964.
Hume, David. A Treatise on Human Nature. Edited with an
introduction by C~ Mossner. Middlesex, England:
Penguin Books, 1969.
de Jou.venel, Bertrand. The Ethics of Redistribution.
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952.

Cam-

de Jouvenel, Bertrand. Sovereignty: An Inquiry Into the
Political Good. Translated by J.F. Huntington.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957.
Kristol, Irving. On the Democratic Idea in America.
York: Harper & Row, 1972.
Kristol, Irving. Two Cheers For Capitalism.
Books, 1978.
"Liberals and Inflation."
pp. 5-13.

New

New York:

Basic

The New Republic, 20 January 1979,

Okun, Arthur. Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff.
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975.
Popper, Karl R. The.Open Society and Its Enemies.
Princeton University Press, 1950.

Princeton:

Smith, Adam. An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations. Edited by Edwin Cannan; introduction
by Max Lerner. New York: Modern Library, 1937.
Steinfels, Peter. ·The Neoconservatives: The Men Who Are
·
· Changing America's Politics. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979.
Tawney, R.H. Equality.
1931.

New York:

Harcourt, Brace and Company,

Wolin, Sheldon S •. "Hume and Conservatism." American Political
Science Review 48 (December 1954): 999-1016.

133

APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by William J. Voegeli, Jr., has been read
and approved by the following committee:

Dr. James Wiser, Director
Associate Professor, Political Science, Loyola
Dr. Richard Hartigan
Professor, Political Science, Loyola
Dr. John Williams
Assistant Professor, Political Science, Loyola

The final copies have been examined by the director of the
thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact
that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the
thesis is now given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and form.
The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

1- 7-oc2
Date

o

.DirectorLs Signature

